

Early Chinese Settlement Policies towards the Nomads

Throughout early imperial history nomadic incursions across the northern frontiers were a perennial problem. The Chinese maintained a variety of responses, including military attacks, border defense works, and appeasement. In addition, the Chinese attempted to establish political administration over nomads who had submitted. This comprehensive pattern of extending control over the non-Chinese on the borderlands also occurred in the south, southwest, and east—areas where agriculture was already a major way of life for the local inhabitants. Whether deliberate or not, the pattern of response expanded Chinese culture and incorporated many non-Chinese into the Chinese empire. At the same time, it caused great instability in the border areas.

This paper examines the settlement policies used by Chinese governments in regard to two nomadic peoples, the Hsiung-nu 匈奴 from about 200 BC to 300 AD and the Turks (including the Uighurs) from about 580 to 900 AD. It is, however, important to note that the resettlement of non-Chinese groups was not confined to these two peoples, but extended to many other nomadic or seminomadic groups, for example, the Ch'iang, Wu-huan, Tanguts, and Khitan. Each presents a unique case and deserves a careful study. I concentrate on the two largest groups and perhaps the most important ones with respect to the Chinese frontier.

HAN ENFEOFFMENTS

During the early years of the Western Han dynasty (206 BC–25 AD) the Hsiung-nu who submitted were individual nobles and tribal leaders. The Han dynasty generally enfeoffed them with the title of marquis (*hou* 侯) and granted tax income in units of Chinese households. In 147 BC seven Hsiung-nu kings arrived at the Han court as individuals. Over the objections of his chancellor, Han Ching-ti 景帝 decided to confer on them the title of marquis so as to attract more defectors.¹ Chia I's 賈誼 famous suggestion of

I wish to thank Edwin G. Pulleyblank for advice in the writing of this paper.

¹ *Shih-chi* 史記 (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chū, 1959; hereafter cited as *SC*) 11, p. 445; 19.

174 BC to use "five baits" to subdue the Hsiung-nu had in fact clearly pointed out that rich rewards could be an effective means of competing with the Hsiung-nu ruler, the *ch'an-yü* 單于, for his own tribal leaders.²

Between 145 and 122 BC at least nine Hsiung-nu leaders who had defected were enfeoffed with tax incomes of between 700 and 11,680 households. One such leader was the prince Yü-tan 於單, who submitted to the Han court in 126 BC as a result of disputes over Hsiung-nu succession.³ Internal disputes among the Hsiung-nu resulted in further submissions. In 121 the Hsiung-nu kings Hun-yeh 渾耶 and Hsiu-t'u 休屠 went over to the Han for fear of the *ch'an-yü*'s punishment of their military defeat. When Hsiu-t'u became reluctant, Hun-yeh killed him and led 40,000 people in submission.⁴ Thus the Hsiung-nu lost the Kansu corridor, which had formerly been under the control of the two kings. Hun-yeh was enfeoffed with 10,000 households, a rather large tax-income unit. Four of his followers were also enfeoffed. In the same year two Hsiung-nu who had previously surrendered were enfeoffed as a reward for military merit in campaigns against their own people.⁵ The enfeoffed Hsiung-nu leaders could pass the titles to their sons, a privilege that may have helped them to merge with Chinese society.

The enfeoffment of Hsiung-nu leaders as marquises continued until 55 BC. From then until the end of the Han period there is no mention in Chinese sources of this practice, except that Wang Mang 王莽 (r. 9-25 AD) conferred the titles of *ch'an-yü* and marquis on Hsiung-nu leaders in his attempt to exert Chinese imperial hegemony over the non-Chinese. One possible explanation for the discontinuation of the practice of enfeoffment is that in 51 BC the Southern Hsiung-nu joined the Han tribute system, under which the Southern Hsiung-nu paid regular homage and tribute to the Han emperor, and the Han in return provided expensive gifts, financial aid, and military protection to the Hsiung-nu. Thereafter the two sides maintained peace, with few defections.

pp. 1018-21; 57, p. 2078; *Han shu* 漢書 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1962; hereafter cited as *HS*) 17, pp. 639-41; 40, p. 2061.

² Chia I, *Hsin-shu* 新書 (SPTK, ch'u-pien, 73) 4, pp. 31-34. The pronunciation *ch'an-yü* 單于 is given in *Kuang-yün* 廣韻, which has three readings for the character 單: 1. *tan*; 2. *ch'an* in *ch'an-yü*, as in Ch'an Buddhism; 3. *shan* as a place name, same as 禪, or "abdicator"; see also Edwin G. Pulleyblank, *Lexicon of Reconstructed Pronunciation in Early Middle Chinese, Late Middle Chinese, and Early Mandarin* (Vancouver: U. British Columbia P., 1991), p. 48.

³ *SC* 19, p. 1021; 20, pp. 1027-29; pp. 1031-32; p. 1039; *HS* 17, p. 641; pp. 642-43; p. 644; p. 647.

⁴ *SC* 110, p. 2909; *HS* 94A, p. 3769.

⁵ *SC* 20, pp. 1039-43; 111, p. 2933; *HS* 17, pp. 648-50; 55, pp. 2482-83.

THE HAN SYSTEM OF DEPENDENT STATES

When the 40,000 Hsiung-nu went over to the Han in 121 BC the Chinese were faced with the question of how to settle them. This was not a new issue. In 174 Chia I also talked of establishing a grand Chinese empire. Once the Hsiung-nu were weakened, he suggested, the Han court would make them subjects, organize every 1,000 households into a state (*kuo* 國), and settle these states along the outside of the Han frontiers from Liao-tung 遼東 to Lung-hsi 隴西. In his plan, the Han should bring each state under the supervision of commanderies (*chiün* 郡) along the border and make the Hsiung-nu guard the frontier, thus enabling the court to remove its own frontier garrisons.⁶ In 169 BC Ch'ao Ts'o 趙錯 had also articulated a frontier policy. According to it, the government would encourage the Chinese to move to the frontier regions, where they would open up border areas and organize defense militias. At the same time, he proposed that surrendered nomads be recruited into Chinese armies, since the Hsiung-nu were familiar with the necessary skills for fighting other nomads.⁷

After 121 BC a system of dependent states, or *shu-kuo* 屬國, was established for the surrendered Hsiung-nu. Previous studies by modern scholars have provided us with a general picture of the system. In summary, between 121 and 111 BC seven dependent states were set up in the Ordos region south of the Yellow River.⁸ Within each state the Hsiung-nu maintained their traditional way of life, namely, their military force and their type of political organization under kings. The primary purpose of the system was to enable the Chinese to utilize the nomads as cavalry and have "barbarians fight against barbarians," as well as prevent surrendered Hsiung-nu from escaping to the steppe.⁹ The Han court appointed in each dependent state a Chinese as defender 屬國都尉, the highest office within such states. In Western Han the office was placed under the Supervisory of Dependent States 典屬國, an agency of the central government whose duties included dealing with non-Chinese. In 28 BC the Supervisory was abolished and its functions were taken over by the superintendent of state visits 大鴻臚. In

⁶ Chia I, *Hsin-shu* 4, p. 31. ⁷ *HS* 49, pp. 2282-83; pp. 2285-89.

⁸ There are different opinions about the names of these dependent states. According to Kamada Shigeo 鎌田重雄, they were Shuo-fang 朔方, Wu-yüan 五原, Yün-chung 雲中, Shang-chün 上郡, Chung-yeh 張掖, T'ien-shui 天水, and An-ting 安定. See Kamada Shigeo, *Shin-Kan seiji seido no kenkyü* 秦漢政治制度の研究 (Tokyo: Gakujutsu shinkokai, 1963), pp. 330-33.

⁹ Kamada, *Shin-Kan*, pp. 329-30. See also Yü Ying-shih, *Trade and Expansion in Han China* (California: U. California P., 1967), chap. 4.

Eastern Han the office of defender of dependent states was incorporated into the local administration.¹⁰

There is no evidence in Han sources to indicate that the people in the dependent states had to pay land tax or tribute. But both the Hsiung-nu chieftains and common people who had submitted performed their expected military obligations in military campaigns against other non-Chinese.

The establishment of the system of dependent states was one part of a larger scheme that followed Ch'ao Ts'o's proposal. While the Han settled the Hsiung-nu south of the Yellow River after defeating them in 121 BC, it also resettled the Wu-huan 烏桓 north of the Great Wall, outside five strategic frontier commanderies—Shang-ku 上谷, Yü-yang 漁陽, Yu-pei-p'ing 右北平, Liao-hsi 遼西, and Liao-tung. Thus the Wu-huan could act as watchmen over the Hsiung-nu. The Han appointed a commandant of the Wu-huan 護烏桓校尉 to supervise them. The Wu-huan were a people living at the southern end of the Greater Hsing-an Mountains 大興安嶺, southeast of the Liao River, and former subjects and foes of the Hsiung-nu.¹¹ As a further part of this strategy, Han Wu-ti 武帝 sent Chang Ch'ien 張騫 in 119 BC on his second expedition to the west partly in order to persuade the Wu-sun 烏孫 in Central Asia, also traditional enemies and former subjects of the Hsiung-nu, to move eastward into western Kansu, formerly inhabited by the Hun-yeh king. But the Wu-sun did not agree to the request.¹²

The Western Han government also made great efforts to move Chinese from the interior to the frontier. Following Ch'ao Ts'o's suggestion of 169 BC, Han Wen-ti 文帝 called for volunteers to move to border areas.¹³ After taking Ordos region from the Hsiung-nu in 127 BC, two commanderies, Shuo-fang 朔方 and Wu-yüan 五原, were set up. It was Chu-fu Yen 主父偃, grand master of the palace, who urged Wu-ti to make such an arrangement on the grounds that since the area was fertile and had the Yellow River as a natural defense line on the north it could be built into a military base for frontier defense. Although his idea was rejected by other officials during court discussions, the emperor agreed and moved 100,000 people to Shuo-fang.¹⁴ In 120 BC as many as 725,000 Chinese were settled in five commanderies: Lung-hsi chün, Pei-ti 北地 chün, Hsi-ho 西河 chün, Shang-chün 上, and Kuei-chi 會稽 chün. The number of garrison troops was reduced.¹⁵

¹⁰ Hans Bielenstein, *The Bureaucracy of Han Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1980), pp. 84, 109. Translation of Chinese official titles is based on Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford U.P., 1985).

¹¹ *Hou Han shu* 後漢書 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1965; hereafter cited as *HHS*) 90.

¹² *SC* 123, pp. 3168–69; *HS* 61, pp. 2691–92; 96, p. 3902. ¹³ *HS* 49, p. 2287.

¹⁴ *SC* 111, p. 2923; 112, pp. 2961–62; *HS* 6, p. 170; 64, p. 2803.

¹⁵ *SC* 30, p. 1425; 110, p. 2909; *HS* 6, p. 178; 24B, p. 1162; 94A, p. 3769. The name Kuei-

The government-sponsored migration continued in 118, 111, and 100. In 111 Han administration pushed farther north with the building of Ling-chü 令居, a town north of the Yellow River, and the establishment of military agricultural colonies in Shang-chün, Shuo-fang, Hsi-ho, and in areas west of the Yellow River.¹⁶

The Han government apparently did not foresee the potential danger involved in such a settlement policy since the immediate results were positive. The scheme established a strong defense. It forced the Hsiung-nu to move away from the Han frontiers to north of the Gobi Desert. Moreover, when generals Wei Ch'ing 衛青 and Huo Ch'ü-ping 霍去病 crossed the desert and inflicted a severe defeat on the Hsiung-nu in 119, the *ch'an-yü* finally gave up his base south of the desert and moved into the steppe in northern Mongolia.¹⁷ For the nomads, the area north of the Gobi Desert was home: a region where they could accumulate their strength and become masters of the steppe. But throughout Chinese history the Ordos region always attracted the nomads. Whenever China was weak, and therefore unable to maintain a strong control over the region, the nomads would come down and make it a base for their incursions into Chinese agricultural land. Whenever China was strong it always endeavored to regain the control of the Ordos region.

As Thomas Barfield points out, the Han court's defense policy and its unwillingness to make peace proved to be most damaging to the Hsiung-nu. The *ch'an-yü* now could not launch easy incursions inside the frontiers, nor could he obtain Chinese subsidies. Without the ability to provide his chieftains with rich rewards his power was endangered. The Hsiung-nu empire declined beginning 101 BC.¹⁸ By 60 BC the internal power struggle in the Hsiung-nu empire had grown to such an extent that more chieftains defected. In 60 BC the Jih-chu 日逐 king, who controlled part of the Western Regions, came over with 12,000 people.¹⁹ This was followed within the year by the establishment of the Protectorate of the Western Regions 西域都護府.²⁰ In 56 BC another group of 50,000 Hsiung-nu headed by Wu-li-wen-tun

chi is mentioned only in *HS* 6. Wang Hsien-ch'ien 王先謙 comments that Kuei-chi should refer to the place east of the passes, and that either *HS* 6 is wrong or *HS* 24 accidentally leaves out the place in its record; *Han-shu pu-chu* 漢書補註 (Peking: Commercial Press, 1959), p. 195.

¹⁶ *SC* 30, p. 1439; 110, p. 2911; *HS* 6, p. 189; 24B, p. 1173; 94A, p. 3770.

¹⁷ *SC* 110, p. 2911; *HS* 94A, p. 3770.

¹⁸ Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 58–59.

¹⁹ *HS* 8, p. 262; 17, p. 672; 94A, p. 3790.

²⁰ Bielenstein, *Bureaucracy*, pp. 109–13; Yü Ying-shih, "Han Foreign Relations," in Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe, eds., *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge

烏厲溫敦 and his son Wu-li-ch'ü 烏厲屈 surrendered.²¹ In the next year two additional dependent states, Hsi-ho and Pei-ti, were set up for these Hsiung-nu.²² In 48 the Hsiung-nu Tung-p'u-lei 東蒲類 king and 1,700 of his people submitted to the Protectorate. They were placed under its direct supervision and did not constitute a dependent state. They were resettled in Rear Chü-shih (north of Turfan).²³ It was this group of Hsiung-nu that accompanied general Ch'en T'ang 陳湯 in destroying the Northern Hsiung-nu in 36 BC.²⁴

The severe power struggle within the Hsiung-nu empire was aggravated by natural disasters and by wars with the Wu-huan in the east and the Wu-sun in the west, both of whom were supported by the Chinese. The Hsiung-nu empire for the first time in its history began to suffer dissension between rival Northern and Southern kings. The Southern Hsiung-nu under the Hu-han-yeh 呼韓邪 *ch'an-yü* were forced to adopt, in Barfield's term, an "inner frontier strategy." They accepted tributary status under the Han emperor in order to use "Han wealth and military protection to win a civil war on the steppe."²⁵ Following this strategy the Southern Hsiung-nu first moved southward close to the Han frontier so as to have easy access to Han resources, and then returned to the steppe shortly after 43 BC. Within a decade the Hsiung-nu empire was restored to its former greatness.

There is a cycle observable in Hsiung-nu relations with Han-dynasty China: when the Hsiung-nu empire faced crisis, the *ch'an-yü* moved close to China for military and economic aid. Once the crisis ended the *ch'an-yü* returned to the steppe and restored the Hsiung-nu empire. The cycle was then complete. However, there is another possibility: by receiving support from China the Hsiung-nu lost their independence, relying increasingly on China's economic and military support. If they did not manage to return to the steppe they could not restore their empire. The completion of such a cycle was a longer and more painful process, one that I discuss below.

DRAWBACKS OF THE SETTLEMENT POLICY

The policy of settling both surrendered Hsiung-nu and Han Chinese immigrants in the Ordos and the Kansu corridor, though effective, as we have seen, created problems and potential dangers. First, the resettlement was never total. There were tribal groups of Hsiung-nu beyond the borders,

U. P., 1986) 1, pp. 411-12.

²¹ *HS* 17, pp. 672-73; 94B, p. 3756.

²² *HS* 8, p. 262.

²³ *HS* 96A, p. 3874.

²⁴ *HS* 9, p. 295; 70, pp. 3011-14.

²⁵ Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*, p. 63.

and the frontier was very fluid. There were never any powerful physical obstacles to prevent the Hsiung-nu inside the frontiers from leaving China or to prevent the Hsiung-nu outside from coming to occupy Chinese territory. In 48 BC over ten thousand Hsiung-nu in the dependent state of Shang-chün left to join the Hsiung-nu on the steppe.²⁶

Second, since the resettled Hsiung-nu were encouraged by their Chinese overlords to remain nomads, thus a readily available cavalry force, there was always a possibility of revolt. Around 55 or 54 BC Wu-li-wen-tun's son, who had submitted to the Han just before, rebelled.²⁷ Towards the end of Han Hsüan-ti's 宣帝 reign several thousand non-Chinese in the dependent state of Hsi-ho rebelled.²⁸ Moreover, although the nomads in the dependent states were outnumbered by the Chinese in frontier commanderies the resettlement by the government was not intended to assimilate the nomads or to make them take up agriculture. Instead the court encouraged the Chinese to engage in horse-raising.²⁹ Ma Yüan 馬援, the head of a leading gentry family in the northwest, had numerous followers 賓客 who engaged in large-scale agriculture and stock raising when he was in Pei-ti commandery.³⁰

Third, agricultural Chinese who remained in the frontier would move back to the interior in times of difficulty or instability. In addition to such voluntary migration back to the interior, the government of the Eastern Han, in its early period, was forced to withdraw the Chinese from frontier commanderies when faced with constant disturbances from the Hsiung-nu. The population figures for northwestern frontier regions show a decrease between 2 and 140 AD.³¹ When the Chinese left, the Hsiung-nu on the steppe soon moved southward into the former Chinese frontiers.³²

Fourth, the success of the settlement policy depended largely on China's control of the frontiers. At the end of Wang Mang's reign, when China was thrown into civil war, ambitious people in the northwest created an alliance with the Hsiung-nu for assistance in seeking power. The Hsiung-nu did not intend to occupy agricultural territory themselves,³³ but they were obviously

²⁶ Yü, *Trade and Expansion*, pp. 79-80.

²⁷ *HS* 17, pp. 672-73.

²⁸ Yü, *Trade and Expansion*, pp. 79-80.

²⁹ *SC* 30, p. 1438; *HS* 24B, p. 1172.

³⁰ Hans Bielenstein, "The Restoration of the Han Dynasty," part 4, *BMFEA* 51 (1979), p. 87.

³¹ Hans Bielenstein, "The Census of China during the Period 2-742 AD," *BMFEA* 19 (1947), pp. 139-40.

³² *HHS* 1B, p. 64; 89, p. 2940. See also Bielenstein, "Restoration," part 3, *BMFEA* 39 (1967), p. 113.

³³ Barfield has a detailed and convincing explanation for this lack of interest; see *Perilous Frontier*, pp. 70-71. But he is incorrect in saying that the Hsiung-nu provided little support to P'eng Ch'ung and Lu Fang, two Chinese warlords.

willing to take advantage of the situation for raids and the establishment of a pro-Hsiung-nu regime in China. In 27 AD the governor of Yü-yang, P'eng Ch'ung 彭寵, rebelled and proposed an alliance with the Hsiung-nu. The latter immediately provided him with seven to eight thousand cavalry. The alliance came to an end, however, with the death of P'eng two years later.³⁴

Another short alliance with the Hsiung-nu occurred between about 26 and 40 AD. This was headed by Lu Fang 盧芳, the last surviving rival of Han Kuang-wu-ti 光武帝 in the wars for the establishment of Eastern Han dynasty (25-220 AD). Lu was a native of San-shui 三水 prefecture of the dependent state of An-ting. In order to legitimize his claim for power and to obtain support from both the Chinese and the dependent-state and steppe Hsiung-nu, he fabricated the story that he was the great-grandson of Wu-ti by his empress, the elder sister of Lu-li 谷蠡, the Hun-yeh king. In 25 AD, supported by powerful local families, Lu Fang entered into the alliance. The *ch'an-yü* set him up as emperor and persuaded other rebel leaders to join the power base in the Ordos.³⁵

SETTLEMENT OF THE SOUTHERN HSIUNG-NU DURING EASTERN HAN

War and peace alternately came and went until the mid-40s AD. Two events thereupon changed the situation in favor of the Eastern Han. First the Wu-huan inflicted a heavy defeat on the Hsiung-nu,³⁶ and in 48 the Hsiung-nu empire was again split between the southern and Northern rivals.

The southern *ch'an-yü* Pi 比 asked to become a Han tributary and to serve as a guard against the Northern Hsiung-nu. When the Han court agreed Pi declared himself Hu-han-yeh *ch'an-yü*. Both sides wanted to follow the precedents of the Western Han. The Southern Hsiung-nu repeated the inner-frontier strategy, whereas Kuang-wu-ti adopted a proposal of Keng Kuo 耿國, chamberlain for the national treasury, that the Han should use Hsiung-nu military force to restore the frontier commanderies. But in contrast to the enthusiasm that Han officials during Western Han had shown in accepting the *ch'an-yü* into the tribute system, this time, everyone in the court discussions except Keng Kuo expressed the view that the court should not accept Pi, since the "barbarians" were not trustworthy.³⁷

The southern Hsiung-nu from this time on made great efforts to return

to the steppe, but in contrast to what happened in Western Han they never succeeded. They began another cycle of relationship with the Chinese that ended in their losing the steppe and their identity forever. What happened and why?

In Western Han the Hsiung-nu first stayed outside the Han frontier and as soon as the opportunity arose returned to the steppe and restored their empire. During Eastern Han, the southern *ch'an-yü*, pressed by his northern rival, first moved to about twenty-seven miles outside the Wu-yüan frontier. Then he requested to move into the Chinese territory of Yün-chung, and finally he was ordered by the court to move farther south to Mei-chi 美稷 prefecture in Hsi-ho commandery (in the northeastern Ordos region). Seven other Southern Hsiung-nu divisions were stationed in the Han frontier commanderies (Tai, Yen-men, Ting-hsiang, Yün-chung, Wu-yüan, Shuo-fang, and Pei-ti), which the Eastern Han government had newly restored, and each division was ruled by its own hereditary chief to watch for attacks from beyond the borders.³⁸

The fact that Kuang-wu-ti admitted the Hsiung-nu into Chinese frontiers and refused to launch a major attack against the Northern Hsiung-nu indicates, as Bielenstein points out, that he tried to prevent the reunification of the Hsiung-nu. In addition, he could use the Southern Hsiung-nu as a readily available cavalry force.³⁹ This was the first obstacle that prevented the Hsiung-nu from returning to the steppe.

As in the Western Han period, the Eastern Han court provided expensive gifts, financial aid, and military protection to the Southern Hsiung-nu in return for which the Hsiung-nu had to send tribute and hostages to the court. But there were major differences between the two periods. In Western Han the Great Wall was considered a boundary between the Hsiung-nu and Han China, whose relationship was that of brothers.⁴⁰ When the first Hu-han-yeh *ch'an-yü* came to the court, he was treated as a guest, not as a vassal, and was ranked above the vassal kings.⁴¹ The imperial seal of pure gold he had received from Hsüan-ti was the same as the Han imperial seal.⁴²

In Eastern Han the Southern Hsiung-nu's reliance on Han political support increased. Although the *ch'an-yü* never had to go in person to the court to pay homage it did not necessarily imply he was more independent. In 50 AD a ceremony was held at his court outside the Han frontier in which he

³⁴ HHS 12, p. 504; 19, p. 708. See also Bielenstein, "Restoration," part 3, p. 103.

³⁵ HHS 12, pp. 505-8; Bielenstein, "Restoration," part 3, pp. 103-14.

³⁶ HHS 1B, p. 75; 90, p. 2982. ³⁷ HHS 1B, p. 76; 19, pp. 715-16; 89, p. 2942.

³⁸ HHS 1B, p. 78; 89, p. 2943; p. 2945. See also Bielenstein, "Restoration," part 3, pp. 121, 125-26.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 126-28. ⁴⁰ HS 94B, p. 3810; p. 3829.

⁴¹ HS 8, pp. 270-271; 78, pp. 3282-83; 94B, p. 3798.

⁴² HS 24A, p. 1143.

was forced to prostrate himself to receive the Han imperial edict as well as the seal, belt, cap, and other symbols of power and rank.⁴³ While in Western Han only Hu-han-yeh *ch'an-yü* received an imperial seal, in Eastern Han each newly established *ch'an-yü* received his seal and other symbols of power from the Han court.⁴⁴ This suggests more than mere ceremony, but in fact the real source of the *ch'an-yü*'s authority. The rituals showed the Hsiung-nu's subordinate position to Han and the need for Han political support.

Some modern scholars argue that during Eastern Han the Southern Hsiung-nu maintained independence within the Chinese frontiers. It is true that the settlement of the Southern Hsiung-nu was different from the system of the dependent states. The *ch'an-yü* maintained his title with all his political structures intact. The Hsiung-nu kept their way of life and traditional customs to a large extent. The *Chin-shu* 晉書 chapter titled "Account of the Northern Ti 狄" has a passage contradicting this view. It says that the Southern Hsiung-nu maintained their tribes in the Eastern Han era but were also subject to local Chinese administrations, thus similar to registered households without having to pay tax. However it is doubtful, as T'ang Ch'ang-ju observes, that this was really the case.⁴⁵

The historical evidence shows that Hsiung-nu independence lacked a strong basis from the beginning and that it gradually decreased as Chinese control was intensified through various means. Han supervision over the Southern Hsiung-nu was reenforced under the Eastern Han dynasty. Whereas the Western Han created an office titled vice-commandant in charge of the Hsiung-nu 使匈奴副校尉, the Eastern Han set up an office in 50 AD titled leader of court-gentlemen in charge of the Hsiung-nu 使匈奴中郎將, whose duties were more fully specified. He was to protect the southern *ch'an-yü* and to take part in his administration of the law.⁴⁶ Initially he had two retainers, and the number increased to 12 in 90 AD when the southern *ch'an-yü* brought under him a large number of newly surrendered Northern Hsiung-nu.⁴⁷ In 65 the office of the general who crosses the Liao (River) 度遼將軍, which had existed in Western Han, was permanently set up, and the Campaigning Army That Crosses the Liao 度遼營 was sta-

tioned in Man-po 曼柏, Wu-yüan. The army was to prevent the escape of the Hsiung-nu to the steppe and to cut off the communication between the Southern and Northern Hsiung-nu.⁴⁸

For half a century the southern *ch'an-yü* cherished the hope of rebuilding the Hsiung-nu empire but his strength was inadequate without essential Han support. After the reign of Kuang-wu-ti (25-57) the Han court resumed attacks on the Northern Hsiung-nu; these occurred in 73, 76, and 85. In 88, knowing that the Northern Hsiung-nu had just been severely attacked by the Hsien-pi 鮮卑, a people living in the area between the Mongolia steppe and east of the Greater Hsing-an Mountains, the southern *ch'an-yü*, with the hope of reunification, asked the court to help in a major campaign against the Northern Hsiung-nu. There were two opinions put forward in the discussions that followed. One represented by Keng Ping 耿秉, chamberlain for the imperial insignia, a son of Keng Kuo, hoped to bring about the final defeat of the Northern Hsiung-nu, and the opposition represented by Sung I 宋意, imperial secretary, insisted that the return of the Southern Hsiung-nu to the north would be like freeing a safely caged tiger, and would not only cause the Han to lose a check against the Hsien-pi, but would also revive the threat of a united Hsiung-nu empire.⁴⁹

The court decided in favor of war against the Northern Hsiung-nu. The Han and Southern Hsiung-nu troops inflicted a severe defeat on the Northern Hsiung-nu in 89 and continued the attacks until 91.⁵⁰ But the Southern Hsiung-nu were still unable to return to the steppe, because when the Northern Hsiung-nu ceased to be any real threat the Hsien-pi immediately occupied all of their territory and incorporated over "ten thousand tents" of their people.⁵¹ The occupation of the steppe by the Hsien-pi made it impossible for the Southern Hsiung-nu to return there.

Bielenstein believes that the strength of the Southern Hsiung-nu gradually grew during the Eastern Han. To support his argument he cites the figure that in 90 AD the southern *ch'an-yü* controlled 237,300 individuals and 50,170 able-bodied soldiers, some of whom were newly surrendered Northern Hsiung-nu.⁵² Based on the same figure, Ma Ch'ang-shou 馬長壽 infers from the distinction between commoners and soldiers that in contrast to earlier times, when all male adults were soldiers, under Chinese influence

⁴³ HHS 89, pp. 2943-44; Bielenstein, "Restoration," part 3, pp. 120-21.

⁴⁴ HHS 89, p. 2945; Bielenstein, "Restoration," part 3, p. 122.

⁴⁵ T'ang Ch'ang-ju 唐長孺, "Chin-tai pei-ching ko-tsu pien-luan te hsing-chih chi wu-Hu cheng-ch'uan tsai Chung-kuo te t'ung-chih" 晉代北境各族變亂的性質及五胡政權在中國的統治, in T'ang, *Wei-Chin Nan-Pei-ch'ao-shih lun-t'ung* 魏晉南北朝史論叢 (Peking: Sheng-huo tu-shu hsin-chih san-lien shu-tien, 1955), p. 137.

⁴⁶ Bielenstein, "Restoration," part 3, pp. 121-22; idem, *Bureaucracy*, pp. 110-12.

⁴⁷ HHS 89, p. 2954.

⁴⁸ HHS 89, p. 2949; Bielenstein, "Restoration," part 3, pp. 127-28; idem, *Bureaucracy*, pp. 117, 120.

⁴⁹ HHS 41, pp. 1415-16; 89, pp. 2952-53; Yuan Hung 袁宏, *Hou Han chi* 後漢紀 (SPTK, ch'u-pien, 23-24) 12, pp. 106-7.

⁵⁰ HHS 89, p. 2953. ⁵¹ HHS 90, p. 2986.

⁵² Bielenstein, "Restoration," part 3, p. 129.

some now raised stock or engaged in agriculture.⁵³ The change from a totally nomadic society to a more settled one may have in effect reduced both military strength and mobility.

By this time we begin to see disputes within the Hsiung-nu. One involved a pro-Han faction and anti-Han faction, the latter mostly composed of newly surrendered Northern Hsiung-nu. The first conflict came into the open in 94 between the An-kuo 安國 *ch'an-yü* and the "wise king of the left" Shih-tzu 師子. According to Chinese records, after he became *ch'an-yü* An-kuo planned to eliminate Shih-tzu because of the latter's favor from the previous *ch'an-yü* and from the Chinese court. An-kuo found support from the newly surrendered Hsiung-nu, who had often been attacked by Shih-tzu. The involvement of Han court officials in the disputes made the matter worse. Tu Ch'ung 杜崇, leader of court-gentlemen in charge of the Hsiung-nu, was not on good terms with An-kuo. When An-kuo decided to send his complaint to the court Tu Ch'ung intrigued to stop the letter, and with Chu Hui 朱徽, general who crosses the Liao, reported to the court that An-kuo was planning to rebel. All of this finally led to the rebellion of An-kuo, who was subsequently killed by his own people. Shih-tzu became the *ch'an-yü*. But the rebellion continued to smolder and involved 200,000 newly surrendered Hsiung-nu. They established a new *ch'an-yü*, Feng-hou 逢侯. He returned to north of the Gobi in 95, but his people were poorly organized and he submitted to the Chinese in 118 after constant attacks by the Hsien-pi and the southern *ch'an-yü*. In 96 another rebellion broke out, this one led by a king sympathetic with An-kuo. The rebellious Hsiung-nu raided outside Han fortifications and were soon subdued.⁵⁴

Between 109 and 110 the southern *ch'an-yü* was persuaded by a Chinese to rebel. He failed, but was pardoned by the court and resumed his position. From that time until 188 five Hsiung-nu rebellions took place—124, 140-42, 155, 158, and 166. The *ch'an-yü* was not directly involved in any of them. In 124, when the newly surrendered Hsiung-nu chieftain tried to persuade him to rebel, the *ch'an-yü* refused by saying that he was old and had a debt of gratitude to the Han.⁵⁵

That the *ch'an-yü* after 110 was not involved in rebellion shows that there was little concerted will among the Hsiung-nu to rebuild their independent power and that the *ch'an-yü* was not in strong control of his people. Under the tribute system Chinese annual payment to the Hsiung-nu between

50 and 100 amounted to over a hundred million cash.⁵⁶ Such an amount may have functioned to "corrupt" the *ch'an-yü*. The weakening of the *ch'an-yü*'s position was also clearly demonstrated when in 140 he was forced to commit suicide by Ch'en Kuei 陳龜, leader of court-gentlemen in charge of the Hsiung-nu, for his inability to prevent the rebellion by his people. In 158 the *ch'an-yü* was imprisoned for the same reason by Chang Huan 張奐, northern leader of court gentlemen. He was restored only upon the order of Han Huan-ti 桓帝. As a result of disputes between the *ch'an-yü* and leader of court-gentlemen in charge of the Hsiung-nu, Chang Hsiu 張脩, the *ch'an-yü* was killed in 179 by Chang, who then established a new *ch'an-yü* on his own initiative. Both Chen Kuei and Chang Hsiu were, however, punished by the Han court.⁵⁷

Since the *ch'an-yü* was brought more and more under Chinese control and often had to dispatch his people in Han military campaigns, eventually a rebellion arose in 188 against the *ch'an-yü*.⁵⁸ From the 180s on, Han China was embroiled in its own internal turmoil. Instead of going back to the steppe, the Hsiung-nu now involved themselves in China's civil wars. Finally, in 216, the Hu-ch'u-ch'üan 呼廚泉 *ch'an-yü* went to the Han court's military headquarters in Yeh, which was controlled by Ts'ao Ts'ao.⁵⁹

In Eastern Han the dependent states remained. When the Northern Hsiung-nu were decisively defeated in 83, 85, 87, and 89 the court had admitted over 200,000 of them into the frontiers. Defenders of the dependent states of Hsi-ho and Shang-chün were reappointed in 90,⁶⁰ and the dependent states of An-ting, Chang-yeh, and Chiu-chüan are mentioned in the records. Since these dependent states were not included in the eight frontier commanderies for the settlement of the Southern Hsiung-nu, it therefore would seem that some Hsiung-nu were under these dependent states rather than under the southern *ch'an-yü*. We also read that members of the Hsiu-t'u Hsiung-nu who had submitted in Western Han were attached to Wu-wei commandery.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Yü, *Trade and Expansion*, p. 61.

⁵⁷ HHS 6, p. 269; 8, p. 343; 51, p. 1692; 89, p. 2960; pp. 2963-64.

⁵⁸ HHS 8, p. 355; 89, pp. 2964-65.

⁵⁹ HHS 9, p. 388; 89, p. 2965; *San-kuo chih* 三國志 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1959; hereafter cited as SKC) 1, p. 47.

⁶⁰ HHS 4, p. 170.

⁶¹ HHS 76, p. 2463. Another group of nomadic people, the Lu-shui Hu 盧水胡, was traditionally considered to be related to the Hsiung-nu. They were under the dependent states in Eastern Han. But both Chou I-liang 周一良 and T'ang Ch'ang-ju hold that they were descendants of the minor Yüeh-chih. See T'ang, "Wei-Chin tsa-Hu k'ao" 魏晉雜胡考, idem, *Wei-Chin Nan-Pei-ch'ao-shih lun-t'ung*, pp. 404-5, 412-13.

⁵³ Ma Ch'ang-shou, *Pei-Ti yü Hsiung-nu* 北狄與匈奴 (Peking: Sheng-huo, 1962), pp. 82-83.

⁵⁴ HHS 89, pp. 2956-58. ⁵⁵ HHS 7, p. 317; 89, pp. 2957-64; 90, p. 2983.

THE TS'AO-WEI AND WESTERN CHIN DYNASTIES:
SINICIZATION OF THE HSIUNG-NU

Between 216 and the beginning of the fourth century north China was ruled by first the Ts'ao-Wei (220-266) and then the Western Chin (266-311) regimes. At that point Liu Yüan 劉淵, the leader of the Hsiu-t'u Hsiung-nu, who had moved into China in 121 BC and maintained their identity,⁶² founded his own Han kingdom. Chinese relations with the Hsiung-nu began taking on new features.

Generally speaking, Chinese administration of Hsiung-nu within the frontiers grew more involved. After Hu-ch'u-ch'üan's installation in Yeh, all the succeeding *ch'an-yü* remained in imperial capitals. They grew separated from their people and gradually lost control over them. The title became an empty name. The Hsiung-nu were divided by the Chinese regime into five groups, all settled in the area of modern Shansi.⁶³ The Ts'ao-Wei court appointed the Hsiung-nu chieftains as commanders 帥 to govern each group, with a Chinese as defender-in-chief 司馬 to supervise them. The title of commander was changed to commander-in-chief 都尉 in the 280s,⁶⁴ and in the Western Chin period the title of defender-in-chief was also given to the Hsiung-nu. In 290 grand mentor Yang Chün 楊駿 appointed Wang Chang 王彰 of the eastern group of the Hsiung-nu to this office, but Wang refused.⁶⁵ While the Hsiung-nu maintained their tribal organization the chieftains received Chinese official titles and were brought into the framework of the Chinese bureaucratic system.

Once settled in an agricultural area, nomadic social structure underwent a gradual change. This was more a result of the change of environment rather than a deliberate policy of the Chinese government. Some of the Hsiung-nu continued to be professional soldiers, but attached to powerful groups in addition to Hsiung-nu leaders. Some became tenants or slaves.⁶⁶ The upper class of the Hsiung-nu received Chinese education. Liu Yüan and his sons were known for their knowledge of traditional Chinese learning.⁶⁷ Chinese surnames like Liu, Kao, and Chao were adopted.⁶⁸

Between 265 and 287 about 280,000 Hsiung-nu and other non-Chinese

were admitted into the frontiers; they scattered in modern Shansi, Shensi, Hopei, Honan, and Kansu, living among the Chinese.⁶⁹ The purpose of admitting such a large number of non-Chinese was to increase productive labor and military forces in a severely depopulated north.⁷⁰

While the inflow implied a potential for peace, some Chinese saw a potential danger of instability. As early as 168 Tuan Ying 段穎, the commandant who protects the Ch'iang 護羌校尉, proposed an aggressive policy towards the Hsiung-nu and Ch'iang (a seminomadic Tibeto-Burman people) who had settled inside the frontier.⁷¹ In 251 Teng Ai 鄧艾 suggested a "divide and rule" policy towards the Hsiung-nu in Ping-chou, warning that although the *ch'an-yü* in the capital did not possess any real power, the Hsiung-nu in Ping-chou had become increasingly powerful.⁷²

The Chinese were aware of both the usefulness and danger of a Hsiung-nu military force, and therefore when there was a suggestion early in the 270s that the Western Chin court use the Hsiung-nu force led by Liu Yüan to recover from the Hsien-pi the Ch'in-Liang region, the court refused for fear that Liu would expand his power and threaten the Chin.⁷³ Two famous warnings of the danger of the settlement policy came from attendant censor of Hsi-ho Kuo Chin 郭晉 and Chiang T'ung 江統. Kuo urged the removal of the non-Chinese. He could see the danger of what soon actually happened when the non-Chinese rebelled and overthrew the Western Chin regime. His warning, however, was not heeded.⁷⁴

In 299 Chiang T'ung also expressed objections to the settlement of non-Chinese inside the Great Wall. His opinion was based on the belief that the nomads were fundamentally different from the Chinese; therefore they could not be transformed by Chinese ways. His essay "On the Migration of the Jung" 徙戎論 argues that the Jung and Ti were the most greedy and ferocious among the four "barbarians," and that they submitted only when weak and rebelled when strong. Accordingly, even the legendary sage kings had been unable to extend civilization to them and lead them to the proper path. In later Chou times (before Western Han), he said, some Chinese states invited the "barbarians" to enter China and appeased them in order to put them to use. The result was disastrous. However, from Han to Ts'ao-Wei, the Chinese had resettled even more "barbarians" inside China in order to employ their warriors, and this had caused even more troubles. He urged that the Chin emperor move the "barbarians" outside China before

⁶² Tang, "Wei-Chin tsa-Hu k'ao," pp. 382-89. ⁶³ Ma, *Pei-Ti yü Hsiung-nu*, p. 86.

⁶⁴ *Chin-shu* 晉書 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1974; hereafter cited as CS) 97, p. 2548; 101, p. 2645; *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* 資治通鑑 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1956; hereafter cited as TCTC) 82, p. 2598.

⁶⁵ TCTC 82, pp. 2602-3. ⁶⁶ Ma, *Pei-Ti yü Hsiung-nu*, pp. 87-92. ⁶⁷ CS 101.

⁶⁸ Yao Wei-yüan 姚薇元, *Pei-ch'ao Hu-hsing k'ao* 北朝胡姓考 (Peking: K'o-hsüeh ch'u-pan-she, 1958), pp. 279-84.

⁶⁹ CS 3, p. 68; p. 70; 97, p. 2549; Ma, *Pei-Ti yü Hsiung-nu*, pp. 92-93.

⁷⁰ Tang, "Chin-tai pei-ching ko-tsu," pp. 132-33. ⁷¹ HHS 65, pp. 2148-49.

⁷² SKC 28, p. 776. ⁷³ CS 101, p. 2646; TCTC 80, p. 2555. ⁷⁴ CS 94, p. 2649.

they could accumulate strength and rise in revolt. His advice again went unnoticed.⁷⁵

There had already been a series of rebellions. The settled Hsiung-nu rose in 233;⁷⁶ then a rebellion by the Hsiung-nu and Hsien-pi in Liang-chou lasted for a decade, from 270 to 280, and was followed by rebellions of the Hsiung-nu in 294 and from 296 to 299.⁷⁷ Finally, in 304, the Hsiung-nu in Ping-chou under Liu Yüan rose up. Unlike any earlier Hsiung-nu rebellion, this last was not simply a revolt against an oppressive local government, or a rising to obtain economic benefit, or a movement to leave China and return to the steppe. Liu and his supporters clearly identified themselves as Hsiung-nu, thus attracting all the settled Hsiung-nu and some other non-Chinese inside China. In addition they had clear goals: to take over the Chinese "mandate of heaven" and establish a new regime inside China in place of the corrupt Western Chin. Their regime would incorporate both Hsiung-nu and Chinese, and thus they adopted the name of Han for their kingdom after the great Han era. Liu's rebellion and establishment of the Han kingdom in 304 AD marked the end of the Western Chin.

For the next three centuries various non-Chinese peoples maintained regimes in north China. They were gradually sinicized and lost their identities. The history of this period and of the later non-Chinese dynasties shows that any non-Chinese people who established their rule in China tried to strike a balance between their own tradition and the native one. In the course of time, however, the maintenance of such a balance always proved to be difficult. They had to face two possible results. One was to become part of the Chinese tradition, not only because they were greatly outnumbered by the Chinese, but because ruling an agricultural society required Chinese methods. For nomads, especially the commoners, acceptance of a Chinese way of life meant the loss of freedom of mobility, and meant that they were bound to the land. This was what happened to the Hsiung-nu regime in north China. The other was to refuse to be swallowed up by the native tradition, and thus leave China. This was what happened to the Mongols in the Yüan period.

From the time when the Southern Hsiung-nu joined the Han tribute system in Eastern Han until the settled Hsiung-nu established their rule in north China and finally merged into Chinese society, the cycle of their relationship with China was completed. The Hsiung-nu disappeared from Chinese history.

⁷⁵ CS 56, pp. 1529-34. ⁷⁶ SKC 3, p. 100.

⁷⁷ T'ang, "Chin-tai pei-ching ko-tsu," pp. 142-44.

THE SUI DYNASTY AND THE TURKS

The first T'u-chüeh Turkish empire was established under T'u-men 土門 (Bumün) qaghan in 552. In 581 China entered a new phase in its history. The Northern Chou emperor abdicated his throne to Yang Chien 楊堅, the first Sui emperor. Eight years later in 589 the Sui (581-618) conquered the Ch'en and unified China, thus ending a period of division of almost three centuries. The Turks also faced a turning point: the death of T'a-po 佗鉢 (Taspar) qaghan, which set off a suicidal power struggle that split them into hostile eastern and western qaghanates in 583. Compared with the Hsiung-nu, the Turks were more prone to civil wars,⁷⁸ and thus the Sui frequently controlled parts of them. Nonetheless, the Turks preserved their state power throughout the Sui period.

Well aware of the internal situation among the Turks, Sui Wen-ti 文帝 abolished the official payments of silk products, which had been made to the Turks regularly by the Northern Ch'i and Chou courts; furthermore, he actively instigated dissension among the Turkish ruling group. As a result Sha-po-lüeh 沙鉢略 (Ishbara) qaghan of the Eastern Turks decided in 584 to make peace with Sui.

Tributary relations were established between the Eastern Turks and Sui under the terms of which the Chinese provided military and economic assistance in battles against the common enemy the Western Turks. In 585, when Sha-po-lüeh was faced with repeated incursions from the Western Turks and from the Khitan, he migrated, with Sui permission, to the south of the Gobi Desert, namely, to Pai-tao-ch'uan 白道川 outside the Great Wall.⁷⁹

Not long after the death of Sha-po-lüeh in 587 the Eastern Turks became hostile to the Sui regime. In 593 a Chinese called Yang Ch'in 楊欽 persuaded the eastern qaghan Tu-lan 都藍 to stop sending tribute and to make forays across the border.⁸⁰ The Sui quickly acted to sow discord between Tu-lan and a minor qaghan called Jan-kan 染干 (Zamqan), a potential rival to Tu-lan qaghan. Through a marriage agreement the Chinese court succeeded in making Jan-kan move south to the old headquarters of the Turks in the Ötükän mountains. This brought Jan-kan under control in

⁷⁸ Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*, p. 138.

⁷⁹ *Sui shu* 隋書 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1973; hereafter cited as SS) 84, pp. 1868-69; *Pei shih* 北史 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1974; hereafter cited as PS) 99, pp. 3293-94.

⁸⁰ This is according to the record in SS 51, pp. 1332-33; *TCTC*, 178, pp. 5542-43. SS 84, p. 1871, and PS 99, p. 3295, say that Yang Ch'in went to the Turks before 589 when Sui conquered Ch'en, and Tu-lan qaghan caught Yang and informed Sui of the incident.

PAN YIHONG

order to deal effectively not only with the Eastern Turks under Tu-lan but also with the Western Turks.⁸¹

The Sui court made every effort to keep Jan-kan within its sphere. In 599 Jan-kan suffered a severe defeat from a joint attack by Tu-lan and the Western Turks and after considering refuge under the Western Turks was persuaded to go back to the Sui. Wen-ti set up the official position of left cavalry general 左勳衛驃騎將軍 and commissioned it with special power to protect the Turks.⁸² He conferred on Jan-kan the title of I-li chen-tou Ch'i-min 伊利珍豆啓民 qaghan, sent another princess to wed him following the death of the previous one,⁸³ and organized 20,000 Chinese troops to help Ch'i-min qaghan guard against his Turkish rivals.⁸⁴ The Turks under Ch'i-min were resettled in Wu-yüan, between Hsia-chou 夏州 and Sheng-chou 勝州 with the Yellow River to the north, as a line of defense against the incursions of Tu-lan qaghan.⁸⁵

Now the relationship between the Sui and the Eastern Turks under Ch'i-min qaghan became even closer than that in the time of Sha-po-lüeh. Like the Southern Hsiung-nu in Eastern Han, Ch'i-min and his people were settled on the Chinese frontier under the supervision of Chinese officials with military forces under their command. His title of qaghan was maintained. In 600 Tu-lan was killed by his own men, and a time of civil strife ensued. Ch'i-min's men were dispatched to entice dissident Turks to the Sui side, and many more Turks submitted.⁸⁶ In 601 Ch'i-min qaghan joined forces with the Sui in a military campaign against his Western rivals. The Western Turks suffered a severe defeat, and the Sui court had Ch'i-min dispatch envoys to the T'ieh-le 鐵勒 and other tribes of the Turkish-speaking people who had been under the rule of the Western Turks in order to try to win them over. The envoys were successful, and soon the T'ieh-le and more than ten other tribes came over. As a result, Ta-t'ou 達頭, the supreme leader of the Western Turks, was defeated in 603.⁸⁷

Several aspects of the settlement policy of the Sui deserve mention. Unlike the situation towards the end of Western Han, when the Southern Hsiung-nu maintained close diplomatic relations, Sha-po-lüeh qaghan at first tried to maintain an equal status. In his request for a peace settlement

in 584, he suggested a boundary demarcation with the Sui that put the Turks on an equal footing with the Chinese. He said, "Our sheep and horses are the emperor's domestic livestock, and your silk products are our property. There is no difference between you and us."⁸⁸

But a year later, after receiving Sui assistance in his battles against the Western Turks and the A-pa 阿拔 (Apar) tribe, Sha-po-lüeh formally declared himself a Sui vassal and offered to send hostages and annual tribute to the Sui court. Still he expressed the wish to maintain nomadic culture, that is, not to change the Turkish dress, hairstyle, and language.⁸⁹

Ch'i-min qaghan, in contrast, made repeated requests in 607 to be allowed to adopt Chinese dress and hairstyle. Even though Sui Yang-ti's 煬帝 ministers suggested granting permission as proof of successful sinicization, the emperor refused, insisting instead on retaining cultural distinctions between the Chinese and nomads. In his letter to Ch'i-min he explained that since the north of the Gobi Desert had not yet been made tranquil, expeditionary forces still had to be sent in from time to time to quell disturbances.⁹⁰

Although the Sui rulers did not intend to sinicize the Turks they built walled towns for them. In 599 the town of Ta-li 大利 was constructed for the Eastern Turks in Shuo-chou 朔州.⁹¹ In 602 walled towns were built in Chin-ho 金河 and Ting-hsiang 定襄,⁹² and it appears that Ch'i-min moved to this area.⁹³ In 608 houses and a walled town were built for Ch'i-min in Wan-shou-shu 萬壽成, between Chin-ho and Ting-hsiang.⁹⁴ These walled towns were presumably built initially for purposes of defense and of making life more comfortable for the Turkish chieftains. Since the Turks were not encouraged to take up agriculture, it does not seem that the Chinese had the long-term intention to make these towns centers of large-scale settlement, or that a walled town was regarded as a symbol of sedentary life.

As in previous times the settlement policy caused doubt and concern among the Chinese. After the defeat of the Western Turkish Ta-t'ou qaghan in 603 the force of the Eastern Turks grew, incorporating the Western Turks, the T'ieh-le, and other tribes into Ch'i-min's sphere of power. Some Chinese were concerned that Ch'i-min, now with inside knowledge about China, might cause trouble in the future.⁹⁵ A suggestion was put forward

⁸¹ SS 84, p. 1868; PS 99, p. 3293; TCTC 176, p. 5476.

⁸² SS 84, pp. 1869-70; PS 99, pp. 3294-95; IT 197, p. 1068; TCTC 176, pp. 5482-83.

⁸³ SS 3, p. 70; 84, p. 1874; PS 99, p. 3298; TCTC 180, p. 5627; p. 5632.

⁸⁴ SS 2, p. 44; 51, p. 1334; 84, p. 1873; PS 99, p. 3297; TCTC 178, p. 5568.

⁸⁵ SS 74, p. 1697; TCTC 179, p. 5572; Ts'en Chung-mien 岑仲勉, *T'u-chüeh chi-shih* 突厥集史 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1958), pp. 83-84.

⁸⁶ Ts'en, *T'u-chüeh chi-shih*, pp. 83-84. ⁸⁷ SS 3, p. 71; 84, p. 1875; TCTC 181, p. 5641.

⁸⁸ SS 41, p. 1184; TCTC 180, pp. 5632-33.

⁸¹ SS 51, p. 1333; 84, p. 1872; *T'ung-tien* 通典 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935; hereafter cited as *TT*) 197, p. 1069; TCTC 178, p. 5543.

⁸² SS 51, pp. 1333-34; TCTC 178, pp. 5563-64.

⁸³ SS 2, p. 44; 51, p. 1334; 84, pp. 1872-73; PS 99, p. 3297; TCTC 178, pp. 5568-69.

⁸⁴ SS 74, p. 1697; *IT* 197, p. 1069; TCTC 178, p. 5569.

⁸⁵ SS 51, p. 1334; 84, p. 1873; PS 99, p. 3297; TCTC 178, p. 5568.

⁸⁶ SS 51, p. 1334.

⁸⁷ SS 51, pp. 1334-35; 84, pp. 1873-74; PS 99, pp. 3297-98; TCTC 179, pp. 5590, 5600.

that the Sui should move the Turks outside of the Great Wall, and establish frontier garrisons so as to prevent a dangerous situation from developing.⁹⁶ But the emperor was not persuaded.

In 609 Ch'i-min qaghan died and was succeeded by his son Shih-pi 始畢 qaghan. Turkish power continued to grow to such an extent that the Sui court decided to foment discord among Shih-pi's people as a way of weakening his power. This failed, and Shih-pi discontinued the tributary relationship. In 615 Shih-pi and his troops besieged Yang-ti during his hunting trip in Yen-men 雁門 and captured thirty-nine of forty-one walled towns in that commandery.⁹⁷

Although the crisis was eventually relieved, the Turkish attack was the final straw. Coming on top of unsuccessful campaigns against Koguryō and internal turmoil and uprisings, the Sui dynasty went into a steep and rapid decline.

In the Western and Eastern Han periods the Northern Hsiung-nu had been defeated by the joint forces of the Han and Southern Hsiung-nu. But under the Sui regime the Chinese were never able to destroy the Western Turks. After 603, even though part of them had submitted to the Sui, the Western Turks maintained their state. In Yang-ti's time, the qaghanate was under Ch'u-lo 處羅 qaghan, whose lands were in the Ili Basin. Instead of a direct military attack, the Sui, by persuasion and threat of a joint attack with the Eastern Turks, succeeded in bringing the Western Turks into the tribute system.

But actually Ch'u-lo had not fully accepted Chinese suzerainty. When Yang-ti asked Ch'u-lo to pay a visit to him in Ta-tou-pa 大斗拔 valley during his western inspection tour of 610, Ch'u-lo refused. The Chinese then persuaded the tribal leader She-kuei 射匱 of the Western Turks to launch attacks against Ch'u-lo, with the result that Ch'u-lo came in person to pay respect to Yang-ti at the end of 611.⁹⁸

She-kuei then became the supreme leader of the Western Turks.⁹⁹ Ch'u-lo and his people were incorporated into the Sui hegemonic empire. They were divided into three groups: a) a group of more than 10,000 people not fit for military service who were settled by Ch'u-lo's brother in

the commandery of Hui-ning 會寧; b) stronger forces stationed as frontier defense in Lou-fan 樓煩; and c) Ch'u-lo himself in command of 500 cavalry men. This latter group escorted Yang-ti on his tours of inspection, and joined in his military campaigns against Koguryō. In 614 the Sui expressed its intention of helping Ch'u-lo recover his territory, no doubt with the long-term aim of making him responsible for frontier defense. The plan was aborted, however, with the collapse of the Sui.¹⁰⁰

China was thrown into turmoil again towards the end of the Sui, and both the Western and Eastern Turks recovered their comparatively strong regional positions. In the turbulence of civil war, as had occurred between the two Han periods, the Chinese sought outside assistance. Many Chinese rebel leaders relied on Turkish forces to compete with one another. Even Li Yüan 李淵, the future founder of the T'ang dynasty, also had to adopt a very pragmatic, even humble, attitude in his dealings with the Eastern Turks. He needed both to prevent them from invading and allying themselves with other rebel leaders, and to obtain their military assistance in the establishment of his own power.

T'ANG DEBATES OVER SETTLEMENT POLICY

It took the T'ang regime over a decade to destroy the Eastern Turks. As before, it was accomplished by stirring up trouble between two qaghans, Hsieh-li 頡利 and T'u-li 突利 (Tölish). By taking advantage of the internal discord the T'ang achieved victory in 630 over the Eastern Turks. Immediately, however, arose the question as to how to resettle the 100,000 or so Turks who had surrendered. Heated discussions on the matter produced three opinions.

1. Move the nomads into agricultural areas south of the Huai and the Yangtze Rivers so that they could engage in agriculture and become sinicized. Historically, the Han and Sui rulers had drawn a clear line between the Chinese and nomads even when they moved the nomads inside the frontiers. This policy opinion seems to have been the first time that the Chinese consciously considered deliberate sinicization. The sinicization of the non-Chinese during the three centuries of foreign rule in north China might have provided some basis for it. Various officials suggested that the court should scatter the Turks among the Chinese prefectures and counties and make them take up

⁹⁶ SS 60, p. 1459; TCTC 181, p. 5661.

⁹⁷ SS 4, p. 89; 84, p. 1876; PS 99, p. 3299; TT 197, p. 1069; TCTC 182, pp. 5697-99.

⁹⁸ SS, 84, pp. 1877-79; PS 99, pp. 3300-2; TT 199, p. 1077; TCTC 181, pp. 5636-37; PP-5654-55.

⁹⁹ *Chiu Tang-shu* 舊唐書 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1975; hereafter cited as CTS) 194B, pp. 5180-81; *Hsin Tang-shu* 新唐書 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1975; hereafter cited as HTS) 215B, p. 6056.

¹⁰⁰ SS 84, p. 1879; PS 99, p. 3302; TCTC 181, p. 5658.

agriculture and Chinese customs so as to convert them. China would thereby increase its population while the region north of the Great Wall would become an empty land.¹⁰¹

2. Do not trust nomadic peoples; they can never be the same as the Chinese. Proponents of this opinion urged that the Turks be settled outside China under Chinese supervision, and that their power be kept fragmented. Thus China would "have the various states of Hsia within (that is, the traditional Chinese core states) and keep the I and Ti barbarians without." The "barbarians" had always been in the outermost zone. It would be improper to change their customs: as with animals, "barbarians" could neither be disciplined by rules nor taught by benevolence and righteousness, merely controlled by force.
3. The Turks should be settled inside China but keep their own organization and customs, as had been the case in the Han dynasty. Wen Yen-po 溫彥博 was the advocate of this point of view. While he rejected the idea that the Turks should be scattered further inside China on the ground that it would go against their nature, he believed that the nomads could and should gradually be sinicized.

Wei Cheng 魏徵 strongly opposed Wen's idea. He urged that the Turks be sent back to the steppes and argued that nomads with human faces and "animal hearts" plundered when they were strong and submitted when weak. They must not be settled inside China, he said, since they now numbered almost 100,000. Within a few years their population would increase, and their residing close to the T'ang capital would definitely cause trouble.

In his defense, Wen Yen-po argued that the Son of Heaven should care for all creatures, should not turn away the surrendered Turks, and that to settle them south of the Yellow River would provide them with means of livelihood so as to prevent rebellion. Wei Cheng countered, citing the sad lessons of the Western Chin, when "barbarians" lived inside China. Wen Yen-po, however, believed that the Chinese could make the settled Turks obey Chinese orders and adopt China's ethos and laws. The court subsequently would select Turks into the Imperial Bodyguard, just like the Eastern Han's treatment of the Southern Hsiung-nu. He further argued that the cause of the earlier Turkish rebellion was to be traced to the restoration of the Turkish qaghanate by Wen-ti. If the Chinese currently permitted the Turks to settle at their own will, either south or north of the

Yellow River, then their tribes would be scattered and their power split. They could not possibly become a menace again.¹⁰²

Wen Yen-po's opinions, although purveying the old idea of the all-embracing rule of the Son of Heaven, were in fact innovative. For Turks inside China he proposed autonomous status and gradual assimilation. Wei Cheng was more concerned with the possibility that the Turks might rise in revolt against Chinese administration and become its rival again. It was not long until his apprehension proved correct.

The controversy itself presents a good example of the influence of traditional Chinese views of the world upon foreign policy. While Wen Yen-po stressed the hierarchical feature of the Chinese world order, emphasizing that the Son of Heaven was the ruler of all peoples, Chinese or non-Chinese, Wei Cheng revealed a strong sinocentrism. To him, keeping the "barbarians" out was not just a reflection of Chinese superiority, it was also crucial for national security.

The final decision maker, the T'ang emperor T'ai-tsung 太宗, accepted Wen Yen-po's view. Pulleyblank holds that T'ai-tsung attempted to "incorporate Chinese and nomads into a true world empire, each having an equal share and neither dominating the other."¹⁰³ Barfield points out that the Chinese elite in the north had been profoundly affected by the centuries of alien rule, and the early-T'ang rulership displayed distinct nomadic features. It was such influence, he observes, as well as T'ai-tsung's understanding of steppe politics, "his use of personal charisma, bluff, nomadic ceremonies and battle tactics," that made T'ai-tsung accepted as ruler over both China and the steppe.¹⁰⁴ Non-Chinese rule throughout north China for three centuries shows that the nomads could be sinicized. The non-Chinese background of the Li-T'ang family was at least partly responsible for T'ai-tsung's vision of an empire of both Chinese and nomads. His remarks are often quoted to illustrate this view: "Emperors of ancient times all appreciated the Chinese and depreciated the 'barbarians.' I alone view them as equal. That is why they look upon me as their parent."¹⁰⁵

In the arrangements to resettle the Turks, T'ai-tsung did indeed reveal

¹⁰² *Chen-kuan cheng-yao* 貞觀政要 (1465 edn.; photo rpt. Shanghai: Han-fen-lou, 1934; hereafter cited as *CKCY*) 9, pp. 18a-20a; *TT* 197, p. 1071; *CTS* 61, p. 2361; pp. 2369-70; 194A, pp. 516a-63; *HTS*, 91, p. 378a; 95, pp. 3848-49; 215A, pp. 6037-38; *TCTC* 193, pp. 6075-77; *THY* 73, pp. 1312-14.

¹⁰³ E. G. Pulleyblank "The An Lu-shan Rebellion and the Origins of Chronic Militarism in Late T'ang China," in John Curtis Perry and Bardwell L. Smith, eds., *Essays on T'ang Society* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), p. 37.

¹⁰⁴ Barfield, *Perilous Frontier*, pp. 140, 144. ¹⁰⁵ *TCTC* 198, p. 6247.

¹⁰¹ *T'ang hui-yao* 唐會要 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935; hereafter cited as *THY*) 73, pp. 1311-12.

something of an ambition to be a world emperor. Assumption of the title "heavenly qaghan" (*lien k'o-han* 天可汗) boosted his confidence in the possibility of such a reality and buttressed his belief in the responsibilities of the Son of Heaven. Open to question, however, is whether this ideal was realizable, and whether he did, in fact, persist in his belief that Chinese and non-Chinese were equals.

T'ANG SETTLEMENT OF THE TURKS

The first step in the policy of resettlement was to deprive the Turkish rulers of any real power. T'ai-tsung did not allow the rulers to retain their original titles of qaghan, as the Han ruler had done with the Hsiung-nu *ch'an-yü*, and the Sui with the Turkish qaghan. Rather, he conferred on them Chinese official titles.

Hsieh-li was appointed prefect 刺史 of Kuo-chou 虢州, an area inhabited by wild animals and suitable for hunting. When he chose not to go to his prefecture he was given the office of general-in-chief of the right guard 右衛大將軍, with houses and land in the T'ang capital.¹⁰⁶ T'u-li was given a dual appointment as general-in-chief of the right guard, and commandery prince 郡王 of Pei-p'ing 北平 with an annual income from 700 households.¹⁰⁷ When T'u-li became commander-in-chief of Shun-chou 順州 in 630, T'ai-tsung clearly stated to him what he intended by the arrangement:

When your affairs reached an extreme situation, you came to surrender. The reason why I do not make you qaghan is just because of the example of Ch'i-min. In changing the former way I wish to make China at peace permanently and to give your clan permanent security. I therefore make you a commander-in-chief. You should follow our laws, discipline your people, and not invade and plunder each other at will. If disobedience occurs, [the offender] will be severely punished.¹⁰⁸

The tribal leaders were all given the Chinese official titles of general and commandant 中郎將. More than a hundred were given the fifth or higher ranks, and as many as a thousand families were settled in Ch'ang-an.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ *TT* 197, p. 1070; *CTS* 194A, pp. 5159-60; *HTS* 215A, p. 6036; *TCTC* 194, p. 6099.

¹⁰⁷ *TT* 197, p. 1070; *CTS* 194A, p. 5161; *HTS* 215A, p. 6038; *TCTC* 193, p. 6073; *T'ü-fu yüan-kuei* 冊府元龜 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1960; hereafter cited as *TFYK*) 964, p. 11337. *TFYK* says that the income was from taxes of 1,000 households.

¹⁰⁸ *CTS* 194A, p. 5161.

¹⁰⁹ *CKCY* 9, p. 20a; *TT* 197, pp. 1070-71; *CTS* 61, p. 2361; 194A, p. 5163; *HTS* 215A, p. 6038; *THY* 73, p. 1311. Some of the above records say that almost 10,000 families settled in

Records concerning the area-commands set up to resettle the Turks are insufficient and too confusing for one to establish a clear picture. But generally it can be said that from 630 to 634 the Eastern Turks who had submitted were settled into seven area-commands: Shun-chou, Pei-ning 北寧, Pei-fu 北撫, Pei-an 北安, Yu-chou 祐州, Hua-chou 化州 (or Pei-k'ai 北開), and Ch'ang-chou 長州. These commands were scattered south of the Yellow River in the area from Yu-chou 幽州 to Ling-chou 靈州, and all were supervised by the area-commands of Ting-hsiang and Yün-chung 雲中.¹¹⁰ A commissioner-in-chief 大使 of Ning-shuo 寧朔 was appointed to take charge of Turkish affairs.¹¹¹

The potential threat of the Turks was sensed by some Chinese officials right from the beginning. In spite of T'ai-tsung's decision, they still suggested that the dynasty found a Turkish state north of the Yellow River instead of settling the Turks inside China. Wen Yen-po insisted, however, that since the T'ang had already accepted them, it would be a pity to send them away without any good cause. Apparently T'ai-tsung accepted Wen's advice.¹¹²

In 647, after the conquest of the qaghanate of the Hsüeh-yen-t'o 薛延陀, also a Turkish-speaking people, T'ai-tsung established six area-commands and seven prefectures in the territories of the various T'ieh-le people including the Uighurs. Instead of moving the non-Chinese who had submitted inside the frontier, he established a Chinese administrative system in their own areas.¹¹³ In any case, it would have been physically impossible to move so many of them inside China. The posts of commander-in-chief and prefect were held by their own tribal leaders. These institutions were placed under the administration of the Protectorate of Yen-jan 燕然 with a Chinese as protector-general 都護. Upon the request of the Uighurs, post stations were set up along the route stretching from south of the Uighurs to the Protectorate of Yen-jan, to be responsible for such matters as storing supplies for envoys.¹¹⁴

Towards the end of T'ai-tsung's reign more area-commands were set up

Ch'ang-an. The number seems incorrect.

¹¹⁰ Iwami Kiyohiro 石見清裕, "Tō no Tokketsu imin ni taisuru haichi o megutte" 唐の突厥遺民に對する措置をめぐって, in *Ronshū Chūgoku shakai seido bunkashi no sho mondai* 論集中國社會制度文化史の諸問題 (Fukuoka: Chūgoku shoten, 1987), pp. 510-16.

¹¹¹ *CTS* 61, p. 2370; *HTS* 95, p. 3849. ¹¹² *CTS* 61, p. 2361.

¹¹³ Ma Ch'ang-shou, *T'u-chüeh-jen ho T'u-chüeh han-kuo* 突厥人和突厥汗國 (Shanghai: Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1957), pp. 57-58.

¹¹⁴ *CTS* 195, p. 5196; 199B, pp. 5348-49; *HTS* 217A, pp. 6112-13; *THY* 73, p. 1314; Ma, *T'u-chüeh-jen ho T'u-chüeh han-kuo*, pp. 57-58.

in Turkish lands. Kao-tsung 高宗 continued the practice. From 630 to 663 the Chinese established at least fifty-four area-commands and prefectures, and two protectorates, for the Eastern Turks and the T'ieh-le.¹¹⁵ The victory over the Western Turks in 657 brought them under various area-commands. Some were under the supervision of the Protectorates of K'un-ling 崑陵 and Meng-ch'ih 濛池 and all were under the Protectorate of An-hsi 安西. Instead of appointing Chinese, as in T'ai-tsung's time, the T'ang court now appointed two Turks, A-shih-na Mi-she 阿史那彌射 and A-shih-na Pu-chen 步真 as protectors-general of K'un-ling and Meng-ch'ih. Both had submitted to the T'ang during the reign of T'ai-tsung. Moreover, the title of qaghan was conferred on both. They and a Chinese minister were entrusted with the power to bestow Chinese official titles on the tribal chieftains in the protectorates.¹¹⁶

With the establishment of the Protectorates of K'un-ling and Meng-ch'ih in 657 the various states in Central Asia that had formerly been subjects of the Western Turks were also incorporated into the command-prefecture system. At least 119 identifiable area-commands and prefectures were set up. The vast area under this T'ang administration covered Central Asia, reaching as far as the borders of Persia.¹¹⁷ For a brief period, in Kao-tsung's time, China covered more territory than at any other time during the T'ang dynasty.

THE CHI-MI FU-CHOU

T'ang settlement of submitted Turks brought into being the establishment of a system of "subordinated area-commands and prefectures" (*chi-mi fu-chou* 羈糜府州) in the border regions of the empire. The system was applied not just to the Turks but also to other non-Chinese peoples who had

¹¹⁵ Ts'en, *T'u-chüeh chi-shih*, pp. 1066-73. See also Chang Ch'ün 章群, *T'ang-tai fan-chiang yen-chiu* 唐代蕃將研究 (Taipei: Lien-ching ch'u-pan shih-yeh kung-ssu, 1986), pp. 144-85.

¹¹⁶ *TT* 174, pp. 923-24; 199, p. 1079; *CTS* 4, p. 78; 40, p. 1645; 194B, p. 5187; 195, p. 5197; *HTS* 40, p. 1047; 215B, p. 6063; *TCTC* 200, pp. 6307-08; *THY* 73, pp. 1323-26; 94, p. 1694; *TFYK* 991, pp. 11641-42.

¹¹⁷ This is according to Edouard Chavannes, *Documents sur Les Tou-Kiue [Turcs] Occidentaux* (St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, 1903); also "Notes additionelles sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) Occidentaux," *TP* 5 (1904), pp. 1-110. A Chinese translation based on both Chavannes' works with revision and comments by Feng Ch'eng-chün 馮承鈞 is titled *Hsi T'u-chüeh shih-liao-chi* 西突厥史料集 (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1969), pp. 55-58; pp. 192-202. See also Ts'en Chung-mien, *Hsi T'u-chüeh shih-liao pu-ch'üeh chi kao-cheng* 西突厥史料補闕及考證 (Peking: Chung-hua, 1958), pp. 139-53.

submitted. With the greater systematization of administrative institutions the Chinese gave the name "control by loose rein" (*chi-mi* 羈糜) to the institutions under which the submitted non-Chinese were organized. Like the Chinese, these non-Chinese were administered under districts (*hsien* 縣), prefectures (*chou* 州) and area-commands (*tu-tu fu* 都督府). Certain strategic areas were made subordinated area-commands (*chi-mi fu*) under the protectorate. Copying the Han institution of the Protectorate of the Western Regions, more protectorates were founded in T'ang. They combined civil and military administration and employed Chinese civil officials backed by a standing army. A protectorate was under the command of the protector-general, usually a Chinese official, who was to be

in charge of the various barbarians, to pacify them, to take punitive actions, to keep records of their meritorious conduct, to punish their failings and to have overall control of the affairs of the protectorate.¹¹⁸

The earliest attested usage of the word *chi-mi* in affairs concerning the non-Chinese is found in an essay written by the famous Han scholar Ssu-ma Hsiang-ju 司馬相如.¹¹⁹ Most definitions of *chi-mi* come from Han times.¹²⁰ The T'ang concept of *chi-mi fu-chou* is defined in *Hsin T'ang-shu* as follows:

After T'ai-tsung pacified the T'u-chüeh (the Turks), the various Fan ("barbarians") in the northwest, and the Man and I, gradually submitted. According to their tribes [the T'ang government] set up *chou* and *hsien*. The large ones were made into *tu-tu fu*. Their chieftains were made commanders-in-chief and prefects. [Their sons were] all allowed to inherit the posts. Even though there were registers of their tribute and taxation, they were mostly not sent up to the Ministry of Revenue (Hu-pu 戶部). Wherever civilizing influence reached, they were all put under the control of *tu-tu* and *tu-hu* of the frontier prefectures, and were recorded in the statutes and the ordinances.¹²¹

In addition to pacifying and eventually sinicizing the submitted non-Chinese, the *chi-mi fu-chou* on the northwestern frontiers were set up with

¹¹⁸ *HTS* 49B, p. 1317. ¹¹⁹ *SC* 117, p. 3049.

¹²⁰ Yang Lien-sheng, "Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order," in J. K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. P., 1968), pp. 31-32.

¹²¹ *HTS* 43B, p. 1119. Hucker defines *chi-mi fu-chou* as: "Subordinated Prefecture, a category of administrative units into which submissive foreign and aboriginal groups were commonly organized to fit into the Chinese governmental hierarchy, usually headed by hereditary native chiefs and subordinated to a Chinese Area Command"; see Hucker, *Dictionary*, p. 132.

the purpose of "defending the frontiers."¹²² From 634 to 669 the submitted Eastern Turks and the T'ieh-le took part in several T'ang military campaigns. In T'ai-tsung's and Kao-tsung's time the nomadic area-commands not only played an active role in the T'ang campaigns, but also formed an important defense line, acting both as sentries and as buffer areas in the T'ang frontier system.¹²³

The *chi-mi fu-chou* were governed autonomously under their own non-Chinese leaders, even though theoretically they were considered under Chinese rule. The non-Chinese chieftains were appointed commanders-in-chief and prefects, offices in the T'ang bureaucratic system. Those given noble titles like commandery prince were given an annual income from taxes of a fixed number of households. That the Chinese often provided them with supplies of food is evident from T'ai-tsung's edict of 639, which says that the Chinese conferred offices on the Turks, chose fertile land, established commanderies and districts to settle them in, opened up granaries to relieve their hunger and cold, and sent people around to inquire about their grievances.¹²⁴ Some *chi-mi fu-chou*, such as those in the area-command of Po-ssu 波斯, and those which were set up after the conquest of the Western Turks in 659, were under purely nominal Chinese control, a control soon weakened by competition from the Tibetans.¹²⁵

To perform the duty of supervision the Chinese sometimes intervened in the internal affairs of the settled people. When the Uighur tribe was in danger of attack from the Hsüeh-yen-t'o remnants in 648, the Chinese provided military and political assistance.¹²⁶ And when it was endangered by an internal conflict in 648, T'ai-tsung, fearful of the disintegration of the Uighurs, intervened by supporting the pro-T'ang ruler.¹²⁷

That the Turks were subject to Chinese laws is shown in T'ai-tsung's speech to the former Turkish qaghan in 630, quoted above. The Turks were to follow Chinese laws, discipline themselves, and not invade and plunder each other. If disobedience occurred, T'ai-tsung said, the offender would be punished.¹²⁸ In 648 T'ai-tsung personally settled a dispute in which the nomadic people had an argument over run-away horses.¹²⁹

¹²² CTS 121, p. 3477.

¹²³ Kang Le 康樂, *T'ang-tai ch'ien-ch'i te pien-fang* 唐代前期的邊防 (Taipei: Taiwan U., 1979), pp. 44-54.

¹²⁴ T'FYK 964, pp. 1133⁸-39.

¹²⁵ Chavannes, in Feng, *Hsi Tu-ch'ieh shih-tiao-chi*, pp. 192-203.

¹²⁶ T'FYK 973, p. 11432; 985, p. 11573.

¹²⁷ CTS 81, p. 2747; 195, p. 5197; HTS 106, p. 4044; 217A, p. 6113; TCTC 199, pp. 6262-6263.

The non-Chinese were also subject to taxation and payment of tribute just like the Chinese, although in a less regular and systematic way and at lower rates. The fragments of the T'ang taxation statutes 賦役令 contain articles concerning the non-Chinese. These fragments are collected and translated in Denis Twitchett's *Financial Administration under the T'ang Dynasty*.¹³⁰ The items were applied to non-Chinese both in the *chi-mi fu-chou* and in the regular prefectures. But there is no specific item there concerning the taxation of the nomads, the Turks or the Uighurs. Nonetheless we do read that in 644 the Turks and the people of Kao-ch'ang who were attached to the various Chinese prefectures were given tax exemption.¹³¹ In 647, when the Uighur and other T'ieh-le tribes submitted to the T'ang and were brought into area-commands and prefectures, an annual payment in the form of marten pelts was imposed as tax.¹³² Also, the prefectures and area-commands in the Western Regions under the Protectorate of An-hsi paid tribute without a break until the start of the An Lu-shan rebellion in 755.¹³³

SETBACK IN THE TURKISH SETTLEMENT POLICY

As in the case of Western Han, the resettlement policy had its problems. The Turks maintained their own lifestyle and military force; they could rise in revolt. In 639, the younger brother of T'u-li qaghan, who had joined the Imperial Bodyguard after submitting to the T'ang, attempted a conspiracy against T'ai-tsung. He and his followers conspired with T'u-li's son, who was the commander-in-chief of Shun-chou after T'u-li. Though it ended in failure, the incident aroused a universal reaction at court against the resettlement of the Turks south of the Yellow River. T'ai-tsung also voiced his deep regret that he had neglected Wei Cheng's warning. He reiterated his idea that the Chinese were like roots, and the "barbarians" were like leaves, and decided to move the Turks and the various other non-Chinese back to the steppe north of the Yellow River.

The decision, proclaimed in an edict, showed a changed attitude towards the Turks. The T'ang court restored the title of qaghan and abolished all the seven area-commands set up between 630 and 634.¹³⁴ All the Turks

¹²⁸ CTS 194A, p. 5161. ¹²⁹ CTS 3, p. 61.

¹³⁰ Denis Twitchett, *Financial Administration under the T'ang Dynasty*, 2d edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1970), pp. 142-45.

¹³¹ HTS 2, p. 43.

¹³² HTS 217A, p. 6113; TCTC 198, p. 6245; THY 73, p. 1314; T'FYK 170, p. 2052.

¹³³ CTS 40, p. 1650.

¹³⁴ CTS 38, pp. 1413-14; 39, p. 1483; HTS 43B, p. 1125. HTS 43B says that Shun-chou

formerly settled in those areas were moved north of the Yellow River with headquarters in Ting-hsiang. They were treated as outer subjects, in essence, a client state, responsible for the defense of the Chinese frontiers under A-shih-na Ssu-mo 思摩 of the Turkish royal clan, the former commander-in-chief of Hua-chou. He was granted the royal surname Li and the title of qaghan. The nomadic official titles of wise king of the left and wise king of the right were conferred on two members of the royal family.¹⁵⁶

The change in the resettlement policy did not mean that T'ai-tsung had totally abandoned his ambition for expansion and his plan to incorporate the Turks into the territorial empire. In 644 Ssu-mo's people asked to be allowed to move back to the area between Sheng-chou and Hsia-chou south of the great loop of the Yellow River because Ssu-mo was unable to resist the attacks from the Hsüeh-yen-t'o, and could not maintain control over his people. Disregarding the objections from his ministers, T'ai-tsung again resettled them inside China, claiming that the "barbarians" should be treated as members of the Chinese family.¹⁵⁷ But considering his remark about roots and leaves, it is possible that T'ai-tsung realized how difficult it was to be a real "world ruler."

In 651, two years after he had submitted to the T'ang, A-shih-na Ho-lu 賀魯 again rose in revolt and set up his headquarters in the Western Regions; in 657, however, the T'ang court defeated him.¹⁵⁷ From 659 to 663, the Uighur and other T'ieh-le people also attempted unsuccessful rebellions.¹⁵⁸ In 679 the Eastern Turks began a movement to restore their power that attracted several hundred thousand Turks who had formerly submitted. The Chinese immediately dispatched troops and put down the rebellion in 681. But the following year saw yet stronger and more forceful military attacks on T'ang frontiers led by Ku-to-lu 骨咄祿 (Qutluğ), who had assumed the title of qaghan and founded the second Turkish empire.

Under T'ang rule the Turks maintained their own identity. A Turkish inscription says that for fifty years they were turned to slaves and servants by

was maintained and other area-commands were abolished, but this Shun-chou is not the one set up for the Turks. See Ts'en, *T'u-chüeh chi-shih*, p. 198.

¹⁵⁵ CKCY 9, pp. 11b-12a; TT 197, pp. 1070-71; CTS 3, p. 50; 194A, p. 5161; pp. 5163-64; HTS 215A, pp. 6039-40; 217B, p. 6135; TCTC 195, p. 6147; pp. 6148-49; 196, p. 6165; THY 73, p. 1314; 94, pp. 1689-90.

¹⁵⁶ TT 197, p. 1071; CTS 194A, pp. 5164-65; HTS 215A, p. 6040; TCTC 197, pp. 6215-16; THY 94, p. 1690; T'FYK 46, p. 524.

¹⁵⁷ TT 199, pp. 1078-79; CTS 194B, pp. 5185-87; 195, p. 5197; HTS 215B, pp. 6060-61; TCTC 199, pp. 6273-74; THY 94, p. 1694; T'FYK 973, pp. 11432-33.

¹⁵⁸ CTS 195, pp. 5197-98; HTS 217B, p. 6140; TCTC 200, p. 6322; pp. 6327-29; p. 6333; T'FYK 986, p. 11578.

the Chinese, that the Turkish lords abandoned their Turkish titles, held the Chinese titles and obeyed the Chinese emperor, and were made to join Chinese military campaigns. The inscription goes on to point out that the Turks had a clear knowledge of their history as an independent state and that as a result of Chinese suppression they were in danger of annihilation.¹⁵⁹

As during Eastern Han, the T'ang mobilized large forces to suppress the Turkish rebellions, but their efforts ended in failure. The Turks were numerous and inhabited areas both south and north of the Gobi much larger than those of the Southern Hsiung-nu in the Eastern Han. These areas were sparsely peopled by the Chinese, whose control consisted only of a small number of troops and depended mainly on the willingness and cooperation of the non-Chinese themselves.

Although such a settlement policy was adopted by the T'ang court, it was sharply criticized by various Chinese officials. A 696 memorial of Hsüeh Ch'ien-kung 薛謙光 pointed out that the practice of letting non-Chinese settle close to China was a policy without substance, and that even though non-Chinese were nominally given Chinese generalships, there were few among them who did not make incursions into Chinese territory.¹⁶⁰ In Hsüan-tsung's 玄宗 time Liu K'uang 劉況 summed up the sad dilemma the policy caused: when the "barbarians" were strong China exhausted its manpower by attacking them; when they became submissive China then nourished them. In such a fashion the Chinese had been put to work by the "barbarians" for thousands of years.¹⁶¹

One severe impact of the Turkish breakaway from the T'ang *chi-mi* system was that the T'ang could no longer use these nomads for frontier defense. Moreover, they now had to reinforce the frontiers against formerly submissive nomads like the Turks. Since these nomads were now familiar with the frontier areas their incursions became more effective. Faced with such a situation, the T'ang had to change to a more defensive policy by strengthening the frontiers. Towards the end of Hsüan-tsung's reign the northern and western borders seemed secure at last with a heavy frontier defense line. But it was done at the cost of a weakened domestic defense system for the capital, and contributed to the situation that led to the rebellion of An Lu-shan in 755.

¹⁵⁹ "The Kül Tigin Inscription." See translation in Talat Tekin, *A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic* (Bloomington: Indiana U. P., 1968), pp. 264-65.

¹⁶⁰ TT 200, pp. 1085-86; T'FYK 544, p. 6522. Ts'en Chung-mien is of the opinion that Hsüeh presented his memorial in 697. See his *T'u-chüeh chi-shih*, pp. 337-38.

¹⁶¹ TT 200, pp. 1086-87; HTS 215A, pp. 6023-24.

PAN YIHONG

HSÜAN-TSUNG'S PERSISTENCE IN MAKING
A SETTLEMENT POLICY

The restoration of the Turkish empire marked the T'ang's failure in its settlement policy towards submitted Turks. However, the court did not give up the policy. Beginning early in Hsüan-tsung's reign, internal turmoil caused Turks to go over to the Chinese side. To settle the Turks who had submitted between 714 and 720 Hsüan-tsung adopted the following measures:

1. investment of tribal leaders with Chinese official titles and allowing them to reside in China or go back to their own territories;
2. settlement of some Turks south of the great loop of the Yellow River;
3. reorganization of some of the *chi-mi fu-chou* and establishment of area-commands and prefectures in their own territories under Chinese supervision;
4. settlement of Uighurs and other non-Chinese, formerly under Turkish rule, north of the Ta-wu 大武 Army (north of Tai-chou).¹⁴²

The situation at this time, however, differed from the situation during the period of T'ai-tsung and Kao-tsung. Earlier, the Turks had no state power of their own outside China. Now an incipient second Turkish empire inspired submitted Turks to leave China. In view of the rebellions of the Turks, Wang Chün 王峻, administrator of the area-command of Ping-chou, suggested that the court move these nomads farther south to Ho-nan and Huai-nan. He believed that to keep large numbers of mixed Chinese and non-Chinese troops on the frontiers for defense was a bad policy. Hsüan-tsung did not, however, heed his opinion.¹⁴³

Soon Wang Chün's warning of disaster proved to be true. In the winter of 716 two of the T'ieh-le tribes rose in revolt. The direct cause of the rebellion was that vice-protector-general of *ch'an-yü* Chang Chih-yün 張知運 had confiscated all their weapons when they came to submit. After complaining to the patrolling inspector, they got back their weapons, but soon afterwards they rebelled and captured Chang. The T'ang court fought with the Turks and recaptured Chang, who was then executed by the court. The Turks went over to Pi-chia 毗伽 (Bilgä) qaghan on the steppe.¹⁴⁴ In his edict Hsüan-tsung blamed Chang for improper management of non-Chinese

affairs, and stressed that local officials must show great concern for resettled non-Chinese.¹⁴⁵ From the words on paper it seems that the court believed that as long as the local government was benevolent the settlement policy could be carried out effectively. However, it was a difficult job for the local officials to control the non-Chinese who settled on the frontiers. Chang Chih-yün's intention in taking away the weapons of the submitted nomads may have been to lessen the potential danger they posed to the Chinese, to make them docile, and take up peaceful agriculture. Obviously such a measure would have encountered resistance from the nomads.

In 721, just after the nomad rebellion of 720, the Sogdian people who had settled in the former six Hu prefectures of Lu 魯, Li 麗, Han 含, Sai 塞, I 依, and Ch'i 契 in the Ordos region also rose in a revolt that required a year for the T'ang court to suppress. The remnants of the non-Chinese in the region, about 50,000 altogether, were then moved to the modern Ho-nan region. The area south of the Yellow River in Shuo-fang became an empty land.¹⁴⁶ However, in 738 the court set up Yu-chou 宥州 in the former six Hu prefectures in a move to encourage these non-Chinese to relocate there from inside China.¹⁴⁷ In 742, 5,000 Turkish households led by Turkish royal family members came to submit. Hsüan-tsung settled them south of the Yellow River in Shuo-fang, providing them with food and 10,000 rolls of silk every year. Only ten years later, however, Abusi, a tribal leader, would again lead his people in a rebellion.¹⁴⁸

The last Turkish qaghan was killed by the Uighurs in 745. His head was sent to Ch'ang-an. This signaled the end of the second Turkish empire and the beginning of the Uighur, or the third Turkish empire.

One group of the T'u-chüeh Turks, the Sha-t'o 沙陀, had become gradually more powerful toward the end of the T'ang dynasty. It was this group that overthrew the Later Liang dynasty (907-923) and founded Later T'ang (923-936). The Sha-t'o belonged to the Western Turks. They were a small branch but able to preserve themselves throughout T'ang.¹⁴⁹ They came to submit to the T'ang at the end of T'ai-tsung's reign together with A-shih-na Ho-lu. When the latter rebelled in 651 the Sha-t'o split, the anti-T'ang

¹⁴² *Ch'üan T'ang wen* 全唐文 (1814 edn.; facs. rpt. Taipei: Hui-wen shu-chü, 1961) 27, "An-chih hsiang-Fan chao," p. 368.

¹⁴³ *CTS* 8, p. 182; p. 184; 97, pp. 3052-53; *HTS* 125, pp. 4407-8; *TCTC* 212, p. 6745; pp. 6746-47; p. 6752.

¹⁴⁴ Ts'ên, *T'u-chüeh chi-shih*, pp. 453-56.

¹⁴⁵ *TT* 199, p. 1080; *CTS* 9, p. 215; *TCTC* 215, pp. 6855-56; 216, p. 6910; *TFYK* 986, p. 11587.

¹⁴⁶ The following account on the Sha-t'o is based on *HTS* 218; E. G. Pulleyblank, "Gentry Society: Some Remarks on Recent Work by W. Eberhard," *BSOAS* 15:3 (1953), pp. 592-97; and Chang, *T'ang-tai fan-chiang yen-chiu*, pp. 324-31.

¹⁴² For details, see Ts'ên, *T'u-chüeh chi-shih*, pp. 379-410.

¹⁴³ *CTS* 93, pp. 2986-88; *HTS* 111, pp. 4154-55; *TCTC* 211, pp. 6720-21.

¹⁴⁴ *TT* 198, p. 1075; *CTS* 194A, pp. 5173-74; *HTS* 215A, p. 6051; *TCTC* 211, pp. 6721-22.

PAN YIHONG

leader was killed, and the pro-T'ang group was organized in 654 into the prefecture of Chin-man.

The Sha-t'o took part in the T'ang suppression of the An Lu-shan rebellion, but turned to join the Tibetans after 790. In 808 they went over to the T'ang and settled in Yen-chou 鹽州, organized as the area-command of Yin-shan 陰山. The Chinese knew very well the military strength of the Sha-t'o as well as their unreliability. In 809 they chose 1,200 select cavalry of the Sha-t'o and stationed them in T'ai-yüan. The rest were settled in Shansi, and in the following year the court again divided the Sha-t'o into ten groups.

From then on the Sha-t'o played an important part in T'ang northern frontier defense, but the turning point in their establishment of a power base in China came after they had taken part in the suppression of the P'ang Hsün 龐勛 rebellion. The court in 869 rewarded the Sha-t'o leader, commander-in-chief of Yin-shan Ch'ih-hsin 赤心 with the royal name Li Kuo-ch'ang 李國昌, and appointed him military commissioner of Yün-chou 雲州節度使, which was changed to military commissioner of Chen-wu 振武 in the following year. After a period of hostility between Li Kuo-ch'ang and the T'ang, Li and his son Li K'o-yung 李克用 came to terms with the court and played a major part in suppressing the Huang Ch'ao 黃巢 rebellion, which erupted in 882. Both were subsequently made military commissioners. Backed up by tribal armies, in the particular circumstances at the end of the T'ang the Sha-t'o grew into a contending power for supremacy over north China, and eventually Li Ts'un-hsü 李存勳, son of K'o-yung, founded the Later T'ang dynasty.

THE T'ANG AND THE UIGHURS: THE END OF THE SETTLEMENT POLICY

The Uighur empire lasted from 745 to 840. After almost a century of imperial rule, succession crises between 832 and 840 within the Uighur empire vitally weakened the regime and brought about its final end in 840 under the joint attack from a Uighur general and the Kirghiz, a Turkish-speaking nomadic people in Siberia. The Uighurs dispersed. One branch moved west to the Ho-hsi region, Kucha, and the Qarluq area.¹⁵⁰ Two other groups decided to go southwards to China. One of them, headed by the qaghan's brother Wa-mo-ssu 嚙沒斯 (Ormīzt), arrived at the T'ang border in 840 and asked to submit to the T'ang. Another set up a new ruler Wu-

chieh 烏介 (Ögä) qaghan in 841 and crossed the Gobi Desert, hoping to settle close to T'ang.¹⁵¹

Though chaos existed among the Uighurs, the Chinese could not launch an immediate and decisive military campaign against them, as T'ang T'ai-tsung had done to the Eastern Turks, since they were in a weakened state themselves. When the Wa-mo-ssu group was weakened by its internal disputes the court decided to accept Wa-mo-ssu's submission. He was given official titles. His troops were organized as the Kuei-i 歸義 Army. The Li surname was bestowed on him and his brothers, and Wa-mo-ssu was appointed Uighur bandit-suppression commissioner of the southwest direction 回鶻西南面招討使. In 843 he asked to return to the T'ang capital from the frontier, and his Kuei-i Army was ordered to disband. But the army refused to obey, and many troops were executed.

Wu-chieh qaghan posed a greater problem than Wa-mo-ssu. In his weakness Wu-chieh qaghan repeatedly asked for supplies of food, permission to stay on the T'ang frontier, and support to recover his state power. To these requests the T'ang only agreed to provide some grain. By this time Tibet had ceased to be a major power, and there was no other organized Uighur group who threatened, so there was no military need to maintain the alliance with the Uighurs. As a dynasty in decline, the T'ang court had neither the ambition nor ability of its earlier days. It could not rebuild its hegemonic empire by accepting the Uighurs into the frontiers.

The court tried to drive Wu-chieh and his people away from the frontier. When the Uighurs under Wu-chieh qaghan became weak, the T'ang inflicted a mortal blow on them early in 843. With the death of Wu-chieh qaghan around 847, the Uighurs ceased to be a threat to China. The other Uighurs who had migrated to the west settled down in cities, engaging in agriculture and trade. No longer steppe nomads, their threat to the agricultural society of China also disappeared.

CONCLUSION

Chinese relations with the nomads produced a constant pattern. When the nomads were strong they followed what Barfield defines as "an outer frontier strategy,"¹⁵² forcing the Chinese into accommodating their demands

¹⁵¹ The following account is based on *CTS* 195, pp. 5213-15; *HTS* 217B, pp. 6130-34; *TCTC* 246, 247; Haneda Toru 羽田亨, "Tōdai kaikōtsushi no kenkyū" 唐代回鶻史の研究, in *Haneda Hakushi shigaku rombun shū* 羽田博士史學論文集 (Kyoto: Kyoto U., 1957) 1, pp. 234-71.

¹⁵² *Perilous Frontier*, p. 91.

¹⁵⁰ Moriyasu Takao 森安孝夫, "Uiguru no seisen ni tsuite" ウイグルの西遷について, *TG* 59 (1977), pp. 105-30.

for subsidies and trade; when they were weak they chose an "inner frontier strategy," again in Barfield's term, to submit to China and utilize Chinese assistance in order that they could accumulate and recover their strength. The Hsiung-nu, the Turks, and the Uighurs all attempted such strategies.

After the lesson of Hu-han-yeh *ch'an-yü* in Western Han times, the Chinese, for their part, understood these nomadic strategies. But in spite of the constant rebellions by submitted nomads, the Han, Sui, and T'ang courts persisted in their settlement policies, except in the case of the Uighurs under Wu-chieh. From the settled nomads rose the Hsiu-t'u Hsiung-nu leader Liu Yüan, who founded the Han kingdom in 304, and the Sha-t'o Turk Li Ts'un-hsü, who founded the Later T'ang dynasty in 923.

Caught in the web of this pattern, the Chinese would accept submission of nomads out of ideological and practical considerations. In accordance with traditional Chinese political theory, such submission evidenced a benevolent and virtuous rule by the Son of Heaven, a factor that served to strengthen the legitimacy of the Son of Heaven, which was bound up with the fiction that he was a world ruler.

From a practical point of view, it was often the case that the Chinese rulers could not afford to refuse these so-called submissions and subsequent resettlements, particularly when it was less costly than frontier pacification wars. Also the Chinese rulers wished to utilize the considerable military force of the nomads. For that purpose the Han and Sui rulers intentionally allowed Hsiung-nus and Turks to maintain their nomadic lifestyle and customs. Early-T'ang rulers, perhaps having learned from centuries of non-Chinese control of northern China, attempted to bring about a gradual sinicization among the submitted Turks.

To settle the nomads the Chinese created administrative institutions of various types, ranging from dependent states in the Han era, a frontier nomadic organization under indigenous *ch'an-yü* or qaghans as in Eastern Han and Sui times, to the settlement of nomads farther into the interior of China during Wei and Western Chin. Finally, we saw the use of the *chi-mi fu-chou* system to control and incorporate a wide variety of border peoples and the establishment of protectorates to promote control of border peoples during the T'ang. In her study of Chinese minorities in the People's Republic of China, June T. Dreyer concludes that the present Chinese system of autonomous areas was borrowed from the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁸ In fact the root of the modern autonomous regions can be traced back as well to these purely Chinese political institutions in the T'ang.

Nomad settlement policies were always problematical and were applied to only various nomadic peoples and for varying periods. Moreover, there were often other nomads beyond the borders ready to entice the resettled nomads to leave China. In order to have troops to deal with other nomadic peoples, the Chinese encouraged cooperating nomads to keep their life-style and military force. Since the resettled nomads usually lived in border areas without a large Chinese population, there was little to prevent them from rising in revolt and returning to the steppe and even recovering their state power.

The nomads' inner-frontier strategy also had its own problems. It could result in increasing reliance on China and finally lead to their losing the chance to recover their own power and to perpetuate their identity. The Chinese realized this from early Han onwards, and the Turks were also aware of this dilemma. A passage in the Kül Tigin inscription in fact claims that many Turkish deaths were caused by Chinese deception and cajolery. It quotes a saying: "If a people live far [from them], they (that is, the Chinese) give cheap materials [to them]; but, if a people live close to them, then [the Chinese] give them valuable materials."¹⁵⁴

While the nomadic powers repeated their outer- and inner-frontier strategies the Chinese repeated their settlement policies. Both gained and lost in such interactions.

¹⁵⁴ "The Kül Tigin Inscription," trans. Tekin, *Grammar of Orkhon Turkic*, pp. 261-62 (with minor grammatical and stylistic changes).

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CKCY	<i>Chen-kuan cheng-yao</i>	貞觀政要
CS	<i>Chin-shu</i>	晉書
CTS	<i>Chiu T'ang-shu</i>	舊唐書
HHS	<i>Hou Han shu</i>	後漢書
HS	<i>Han shu</i>	漢書
HTS	<i>Hsin T'ang-shu</i>	新唐書
PS	<i>Pei shih</i>	北史
SC	<i>Shih-chi</i>	史記
SKC	<i>San-kuo chih</i>	三國志
SS	<i>Sui shu</i>	隋書
TCTC	<i>Tzu-chih t'ung-chien</i>	資治通鑑
TFYK	<i>Ts'e-fu yüan-kuei</i>	冊府元龜
THY	<i>T'ang hui-yao</i>	唐會要
TT	<i>T'ung-tien</i>	通典

¹⁵⁸ June T. Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. P., 1976), p. 262.