

The Qianlong Emperor's New Strategy in 1775 to Commend Late-Ming Loyalists

The Qianlong emperor 乾隆 (Aisin Gioro Hongli 愛新覺羅弘曆, 1711–1799; r. 1736–1795), relative to other emperors before him, displayed a keen enthusiasm towards official historiography.¹ During his sixty-year reign he oversaw the compilation of over sixty such projects covering a wide range: the Veritable Records of the previous reign, general histories, dynastic histories, histories of particular events and institutions, historical criticism, collections of historical sources, biographies, and geographies.² Works in progress were subject to a highly-developed system of imperial review, as a result of which the emperor regularly scrutinized drafts being compiled by official historians. Normally, while a writing project was still ongoing, the emperor would keep an eye on its contents and the overall approach so as to ensure that his directions were observed and that his viewpoint was fully incorporated.³ Moreover, it was his practice to bestow an imperial preface to important historiographical works upon their completion. Some of these latter works were also published along with edicts and memorials relating to the court's discussions of the histories. On the one hand, the prefaces and attached materials stated concisely the objectives of the project and, on the other hand, summarized official interpretations of the recorded past, which were considered authoritative guides for historiography.

From the perspective of cultural history, the historiographical projects

¹ He Guanbiao 何冠彪, "Qingdai qianqi junzhu dui guansi shixue de yingxiang" 清代前期君主對官私史學的影響, *Hanxue yanjiu* 漢學研究 16.1 (June 1998), p. 171.

² Oertai 鄂爾泰 (1680–1745) et al., comps., *Guochao gongshi* 國朝宮史 (Beijing: Beijing guji, 1994 [1987]) 22, pp. 494–97; 25, p. 536; 26, pp. 540–50; 28, pp. 582–83; 30 pp. 600–3; Qinggui 慶桂 (1735–1816) et al., comps., *Guochao gongshi xubian* 國朝宮史續編 (Beijing: Beijing guji 1994) 85, pp. 809–23; 86, pp. 826–31; 88, pp. 845–62; 89, pp. 863–73; 90, pp. 874–83; 91, pp. 884–98. Also see Guo Chengkang 郭成康 et al., *Qianlong huangdi quanzhuan* 乾隆皇帝全傳 (Beijing: Xueyuan, 1994), pp. 585–88; Qiao Zhizhong 喬治忠, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu* 清朝官方史學研究 (Taipei: Wenjin, 1994), pp. 68–72.

³ He Guanbiao, "Lun Qing Gaozong ziwo chuixu de lishi panguan xingxiang" 論清高宗自我吹噓的歷史判官形象, in *Ming Qing renwu yu zhushu* 明清人物與著述 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Educational Publishing Co., 1996), pp. 146–82.

under the Qianlong emperor marked the apex of Qing-dynasty (1644-1911) control over the making of official history. All details and arrangements of the projects were monitored by and had to be endorsed by the emperor.⁴ But also, as one of the imperial measures of ideological indoctrination, Qianlong historiography reflects the long evolution of Manchu tactics for promoting ethnic reconciliation.

As an alien regime, the Qing house was extremely sensitive to the potential Manchu-Han ethnic tensions that could endanger the security of the empire. To win the cultural recognition of the Han Chinese, the Kangxi 康熙 emperor (Xuanye 玄燁, 1654-1722; r. 1661-1722) had devoted himself to a project of sinification that focused on maintaining a balance between Manchu domination and Chinese cultural adaptation.⁵ Given these cultural achievements, his son the Yongzheng emperor (Yinzhen 胤禛, 1678-1735; r. 1723-1735) confidently claimed the Qing as a Chinese dynasty. In the inquisition of 1728, referred to as the “Zeng Jing 曾靜 (1679-1736) and Lü Liuliang 呂留良 (1629-1683) Case,” he had drawn his arguments from the Confucian classics to refute Lü’s anti-Qing ideas based on Han ethnocentrism.⁶ Following the early-Qing policy of ethnic reconciliation, the Qianlong emperor saw the compilation of official histories as a means to censor the anti-Manchu elements appearing in previous historiographical writings and to claim that the Qing had reasserted the “Man-

⁴ Qiao Zhizhong, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu*, pp. 10-13. Yang Lien-sheng observed that imperial influence on historiographical compilation became more prominent in Ming and Qing times with increasing despotism; “The Organization of Chinese Official Historiography: Principles and Methods of the Standard Histories from the T’ang through the Ming Dynasty,” in William G. Beasley and Edwin G. Pulleyblank, eds., *Historians of China and Japan* (London: Oxford U.P., 1961), p. 50. Comparatively speaking, Qing control over official projects was much stricter than that of the Ming, since most Ming emperors did not have a keen interest in monitoring the compilation process. For instance, except for the Veritable Records of the Hongwu reign compiled during the Yongle period, the compilation of Veritable Records was monitored by the director-generals. See Xie Gui’an 謝貴安, *Ming shilu yanjiu* 明實錄研究 (Taipei: Wenjin, 1995), pp. 34-89, 208-67.

⁵ Lawrence D. Kessler, *K'ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch'ing Rule, 1661-1684* (Chicago: U. Chicago P., 1976), p. 121. Evelyn Rawski notes that Kangxi and other early-Qing emperors “adopted Chinese customs when it was politically expedient for them to do so and rejected them when it did not help them achieve their political goals”; *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions* (Berkeley: U. California P., 1998), p. 7. Also see Pamela K. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: U. California P., 1999), pp. 12-14.

⁶ Yinzhen (Yongzheng emperor), *Dayi jiaomi lu* 大義覺迷錄, in Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan lishi yanjiu suo Qingshi yanjiu shi 中國社會科學院歷史研究所清史研究室, eds., *Qingshi ziliao* 清史資料 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1983), vol. 4, pp. 1-169. On the Zeng-Lü Case, see Thomas S. Fisher, “Lü Liu-liang (1629-83) and the Tseng Ching Case (1728-33)” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1974).

date of Heaven” by glorifying the Manchu ancestors. Through such history projects, the emperor explicitly restated the dynasty’s status as *zhengtong* 正統, that is, a “legitimate dynastic successor” in the light of China’s long and complex tradition of judging its ruling houses.

The narratives of Manchu and early-Qing histories inevitably touched on the sensitive topic of Manchu-Han relations, in particular the ethnic conflicts caused by the Qing takeover in the latter half of the seventeenth century. This soon drew the Qianlong emperor’s attention to the long existing discrepancy between official perspectives on the history of the conquest and that of the educated Han Chinese. For more than a hundred years, there had already arisen a general demand in society for an official recognition of the virtue of Southern Ming loyalists.⁷ From the Shunzhi 順治 (1644-1661) to the Yongzheng periods, however, the Qing house was reluctant to compromise due to its suspicion of the political motives behind such a demand.⁸ Reconsidering the issue, the emperor eventually decided in the second half of his reign to modify the policy in accordance with the socio-political situation of his time, which led to an official reinterpretation of the history of the Ming-Qing transition and a reevaluation of the historical figures concerned. As a result, he initiated the official biographical project that was later entitled *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu* 欽定勝朝殉節諸臣錄 (*Records of All Subjects Who Died out of Loyalty to the Fallen Dynasty, Authorized by the Emperor [Qianlong]*). (Below, this important work is referred to simply as *Zhuchen lu*.)

THE EDICT OF 1766 AND ITS HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE

In 1766, the Historiography Bureau finished the biography of Hong Chengchou 洪承疇 (1593-1665), the former Ming-dynasty (1368-1644) minister and governor-general who collaborated with the Manchus in 1642 and helped the Qing regime conquer south China during the period from 1644 to 1660.⁹ The biography was submitted to the throne in the same year. Going through the narratives of Ming-Qing events in Hong’s biography, the Qianlong emperor was not completely satisfied. He disagreed with

⁷ For a study of Qing intellectual discourse on the conquest history, see Chan Wing-ming, “The Early-Qing Discourse on Loyalty,” *East Asian History* 19 (June 2000), pp. 27-52.

⁸ He Guanbiao, “Qingchu sanchao dui Nanming lishi diwei de chuli” 清初三朝對南明歷史地位的處理, *Mindai shi kenkyū* 明代史研究 23 (April 1995), pp. 23-33; He Guanbiao, “Qing Gaozong dui Nanming lishi diwei de chuli” 清高宗對南明歷史地位的處理, *Xin shixue* 新史學 7.1 (March 1996), pp. 1-27.

⁹ The extant manuscripts of Hong’s biography are now kept in the First Historical Ar-

some of the compilers' viewpoints and decided to set two significant rules to guide future official writings on the history of the conquest period. On July 2 of the same year, he ordered that the Southern Ming princes and their regimes hereafter not be labeled with the derogatory term *wei* 偽, which means "illicit" or "heterodox," and that those Southern Ming officials such as Huang Daozhou 黃道周 (1585–1646) and Shi Kefa 史可法 (1602–1645), who had resisted the conquest, not be condemned as rebels in spite of their anti-Qing words and deeds.

In defense of his decisions, the emperor affirmed that the Hongguang 弘光 (1644–1645), Longwu 隆武 (1645–1646), and Yongli 永曆 (1647–1662) courts should be distinguished from the late-Ming rebellious forces because the former were headed by princes of the Ming royal lineage while the latter were led by bandits or adventurers. It was inappropriate to treat descendants of the Ming house as rebels because they no longer could claim the Mandate of Heaven. Recognizing the moral courage of the Southern Ming martyrs, he further asserted that these historical figures were Ming loyalists who performed their responsibilities to defend the fallen dynasty. From the Qing perspective, stalwart insistence on the Confucian principle of loyalty had to be acknowledged. To explain the previous Qing condemnations of the Southern Ming regimes and their followers, the emperor pointed out that those were necessary expedients used by the new government in wartime in order to accelerate the unification of the newly established empire. Based on these arguments, he came to the conclusion that when all territories had been unified for more than a hundred years, such temporary measures should be abolished and the deeds of the historical figures concerned should be impartially reevaluated.¹⁰

The imperial edict of 1766 marked a watershed between early- and mid-Qing official attitudes toward Southern Ming loyalists. Before the edict, the Qing authorities upheld a policy of denigrating the 1644–1662 anti-

archives of China, Beijing. They are the earliest Qianlong drafts available in China. See Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan 中第一歷史檔案館, fond no. 11, *zhuan* 129. On the biography of Hong, see Fang Chao-ying, "Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou," in Arthur W. Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644–1912)* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1943) 1, pp. 358–60; Wang Chen-mian, "Persistence in Chinese Culture: A Case Study of Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou (1593–1665)," *Late Imperial China* 10.1 (June 1989), pp. 27–62; Li Xinda 李新達, *Hong Chengchou zhuan* 洪承疇傳 (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin, 1992); Wang Hongzhi 王宏志, *Hong Chengchou zhuan* (Beijing: Hongqi, 1991).

¹⁰ Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan, eds., *Qianlong chao shangyu dang* 乾隆朝上諭檔 (Beijing: Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan, 1991; hereafter cited as *QLCSYD*), vol. 4, pp. 896–97; Qinggui et al., comps., *Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu* 高宗純皇帝實錄 (hereafter, *GZSL*), in *Qing shilu* 清實錄 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1985–87; hereafter, *QSL*), vol. 18, j. 761, p. 373.

Qing resistance movement and considered all participants as rebels acting against heaven's will.¹¹ During the Shunzhi and Kangxi eras, when the official, court version of the Ming dynasty, titled *Mingshi* 明史, was being compiled, many Han Chinese scholar-officials had repeatedly suggested that the government openly recognize and praise the virtues of the Southern Ming martyrs,¹² but their ethical arguments did not convince the alien rulers. Even in the early Qianlong period, following the policy of his ancestors, the emperor also tended to omit accounts of the resistance from any official account of the previous dynasty.¹³ Consequently, for a long period of time, there was an obvious discrepancy between government policy and the prevailing ideas of the Han Chinese literati in the evaluation of the deeds of the resistance activists.

The early-Qing policy of refusing legitimacy to the history of the resistance can be understood as a strategic consideration. In the first three decades of the new dynasty the alien authorities were distressed by the resistance activities of Ming remnants in the southwest and coastal regions. As evidence shows, some local gentry and literati in these regions were associated with the resistance activists.¹⁴ In a tense political situation, the new government was highly sensitive to any ideas that might arouse anti-Qing sentiment and jeopardize social stability. From 1644 onward, in order to pacify the Han Chinese, the Qing house openly paid respect to the Chongzhen emperor 崇禎 (Zhu Youjian 朱由檢, 1611–1644; r. 1627–1644) of the Ming, who had committed suicide after the fall of Beijing in 1644, and enshrined Ming ministers who died loyally for their dynasty in resisting the late-Ming peasant rebellions. Nevertheless, the Manchu emperors were very reluctant to acknowledge the martyrdom of Southern Ming loyalists. To a large extent, the unequal treatments of these two categories of

¹¹ This policy was first employed by regent Dorgon (1612–1650) and reflected in his letter to Shi Kefa in 1644. See Batai 巴泰 (d. 1690) et al., comps., *Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu* 世祖章皇帝實錄 (hereafter, *SZSL*), in *QSL*, vol. 3, j. 6, pp. 71–72.

¹² Qinchuan jushi 琴川居士, ed., *Huang Qing mingchen zouyi* 皇清名臣奏議 (rpt.; Taipei: Wenhai, 1967), vol. 2, j. 9, pp. 918–21; *Qingshi liezhuan* 清史列傳 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1987), vol. 2, j. 8, p. 518; Xu Qianxue 徐乾學 (1631–1694), *Danyuan wenji* 憺園文集 (Taipei: Hanhua wenhua, 1971), vol. 2, j. 10, pp. 524–25; j. 14, pp. 727–28; Peng Sunyu 彭孫通 (1631–1700), *Songguitang quanji* 松桂堂全集, in *Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu* 影印文淵閣四庫全書 (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu, 1983–86; hereafter, *SKQS*), vol. 1317, j. 35, p. 270.

¹³ He, "Qing Gaozong dui Nanming lishi," pp. 2–13; and idem, "Qingchu sanchao dui Nanming lishi diwei de chuli," pp. 23–33.

¹⁴ Quan Zuwang 全祖望 (1705–1755), *Jieqiting ji waibian* 鮚埼亭集, in Zhu Zhuyi 朱錕禹, ed., *Quan Zuwang ji huijiao jizhu* 全祖望集彙校集注 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2000), vol. 1, j. 6, pp. 839–41; vol. 2, j. 10, pp. 925–40.

loyalists disclosed the Manchus' apprehension: any official expression of sympathy with those who resisted the Qing might send the public a false message that the government was going to compromise with rebellious activities under the name of Ming restoration.

From a cultural perspective, the early-Qing official attitude toward Southern Ming loyalists also declared a determination to defend legitimate status in the Chinese tradition of dynastic succession.¹⁵ The imperial version of the founding of the Qing held that the Ming dynasty had lost the Mandate of Heaven and was crushed by the rebel Li Zicheng 李自成 (1604–1645) in 1644. Chosen by heaven, the Manchus then defeated Li, took China directly from the hands of bandits and saved the Han Chinese from wars and disasters.¹⁶ From that moment, the Manchu rulers constantly proclaimed that they were the only legitimate sovereigns in the Chinese world and the Southern Ming regimes were illegitimate. This interpretation became state policy and remained unchanged until the mid-Qianlong era. The literary inquisitions of the works of Dai Mingshi 戴名世 (1653–1713) in 1711 and Lü Liuliang in 1728 clearly demonstrated that under no circumstances would the government tolerate any challenge to it.

In response to the demand of the Han Chinese scholar-officials, the Kangxi emperor had agreed in 1680 to incorporate the Hongguang and Yongli histories as appendices to the *Mingshi*'s Basic Annals (the chronological summaries of the activities of the court).¹⁷ Yet, when the *Nanshan ji* 南山集 controversy broke into the open in 1711, he immediately changed his mind. Existing sources indicate that one of the offenses of Dai Mingshi, the author of *Nanshan ji*, was his dissenting opinion concerning dynastic legitimacy. In contrast to the official view, Dai wrote that in the conquest era, the Southern Ming, rather than the Qing, was the legitimate successor to the Ming.¹⁸ The emperor became alerted to the fact that in defiance of the repeated injunctions of the government, some of his Han subjects still

¹⁵ He, "Qingchu sanchao dui Nanming lishi diwei de chuli," pp. 28–29. Chan Hok-lam has pointed out that traditional political theories of legitimacy in imperial China emphasized the "correct succession" or *zheng tong* of rulers and dynasties. Although the interpretation of legitimate succession varied in different Chinese dynasties, when a new dynasty was established, the founder would officially proclaim a shift of the Mandate of Heaven to itself; *Legitimation in Imperial China: Discussion under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty (1115–1234)* (Seattle: U. Washington P., 1984), pp. 19–48. This emphasis on political linkage with the past was strengthened under the influence of the neo-Confucian idea of "transmission of the Way" (*daotong* 道統) after the Song dynasty.

¹⁶ *SZSL* 6, p. 71.

¹⁷ He, "Qingchu sanchao dui Nanming lishi diwei de chuli," pp. 26–27.

¹⁸ He Guanbiao, *Dai Mingshi yanjiu* 戴名世研究 (Hong Kong: Department of Chinese,

considered the first decade of Qing rule illegitimate. Enraged at Dai's disloyalty and in an attempt to strengthen ideological control, he soon decided to resume the early-Qing policy of demoting the resistance and depriving the Southern Ming regimes of their historical positions in the *Mingshi* compilation. The following emperor, Yongzheng, ruled with a strong hand and suppressed all heterodox ideas. The Lü-Zeng case of 1728 also reminded him of potential anti-Qing elements and reinforced his defensive attitude toward the Manchu-Han ethnic issues of the conquest period.

Because Kangxi and Yongzheng interpreted the Southern Ming resistance as rebellion, they naturally did not acknowledge those figures who served the "rebellious" entities. Therefore, it is not surprising that during the first hundred years of the dynasty, despite promoting neo-Confucian ideology, the government did not accept the ethical perspective on the resistance that was popular among Han scholars and firmly refused to recognize the virtue of the historical figures concerned. It was not until the edict of 1766, a century after the demise of the last Southern Ming regime, that the Qing government made concessions to the constant demands of the literati for an official rehabilitation of the Southern Ming martyrs. The Qianlong edict thus marked the end of the Qing imperial condemnation of the resistance.

QIANLONG'S REINTERPRETATION OF THE CONQUEST

In the first three decades of his reign, the Qianlong emperor basically insisted on the early-Qing official policy in tackling the history of the conquest. His dissatisfaction with the quality of the *Mingshi* notwithstanding, he did not find it necessary to reexamine the previous imperial interpretation of late-Ming events.¹⁹ This attitude was evinced in the 1739–1746 history project named *An Outline History of the Ming Dynasty*, in which the resistance, together with the sensitive materials regarding the early Ming-Manchu relationship, was intentionally excluded.²⁰ It was during the com-

University of Hong Kong, 1987), pp. 253–310. For Dai's opinion concerning the legitimate rule of the conquest period, see Dai, *Dai Mingshi ji* 戴名世集, ed. Wang Shumin 王樹民 (Beijing: Zhonghua 1986) 1, pp. 2–3.

¹⁹ The emperor's dissatisfaction was reflected in the preface of Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 (1672–1755) et al., comps., *Yuding zizhi tongjian gangmu sanbian* 御定資治通鑑綱目三編, in *SKQS*, vol. 340, pp. 2–4. Also see Hongli (Qianlong emperor), *Qing Gaozong [Qianlong] yuzhi shiwen quanji* 清高宗 [乾隆] 御製詩文全集 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue, 1993; hereafter, *YZSWQJ*), vol. 10, j. 10, p. 397.

²⁰ The work was originally named *Mingshi gangmu* 明史綱目, *Mingji gangmu* 明紀綱目, or *Mingjian gangmu* 明鑑綱目; revised 1775–1782 and renamed *Yuding zizhi tongjian gangmu*

pilation of *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan* 御批歷代通鑑輯覽 (*A Comprehensive Mirror of Successive Reigns, Imperially Annotated* [by Qianlong]), a general history of China, that the emperor began to consider seriously an official reexamination of Southern Ming history based on neo-Confucianism.²¹

An imperial reevaluation in the mid-eighteenth century of Southern Ming figures can be explained by economic, social, and cultural developments during the Qianlong reign. Unlike his ancestors, Kangxi and Yongzheng, who reigned during periods of social discontent or political factionalism, the Qianlong emperor presided over a period of political stability and economic prosperity. The strength of the empire reached its peak with a series of military accomplishments in the western territories from the 1730s to the 1760s.²² The result was a favorable environment for cultural bloom, which consequently aroused the emperor to a careful consideration of the government's role in the cultural development of the empire. In the process, his attention was drawn particularly to the government's active participation in cultural affairs and the formulation of an appropriate policy. As part of this, his new interpretation of the conquest in some sense reveals a vaulting ambition to seek cultural hegemony through official historiography. It also reflects his deliberate attempt to manipulate the intellectual discourse on Chinese culture and Confucian values.²³

As many historians note, apart from other cultural activities, Qianlong

sanbian (see previous n.). The original work was not available after the Qianlong period. Yet, even in the revised version, there is no narrative of the Longwu and Yongli events, and evidently, the brief accounts of the Hongguang regime were added after 1755; vol. 340, j. 40, pp. 765-801. For a study of the compilation history, see He Guanbiao, "Qing Gaozong gangmuti shiji bianzuan kao" 清高宗綱目體史籍編纂考, in *Ming Qing renwu yu zhushu*, pp. 245-56, 272-76.

²¹ The exact date of compilation of the work is unclear. In Yongrong 永瑤 (1743-1790) et al., comps., *Siku quanshu zongmu* 四庫全書總目 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1965,) vol. 1, j. 47, p. 430, we learn that it was initiated in 1767; but *Guochao gongshi xubian* (j. 89, p. 864) places it in 1768. Obviously, both of these dates are incorrect, since the earliest sources regarding compilation date to 1759. (See *Qingshi liezhuan* vol. 18, j. 71, pp. 5832-33.) According to He, "Qing Gaozong gangmuti shiji bianzuan kao," pp. 258-66, the period of compilation was around 1759-68. Also see Qiao, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu*, pp. 305-7.

²² Albert Feuerwerker, *State and Society in Eighteenth-Century China: The Ch'ing Empire in Its Glory* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1976), pp. 77-94. For a study of Qianlong military accomplishments in the western territories, see Zhuang Jifa 莊吉發, *Qing Gaozong shiquan wugong yanjiu* 清高宗十全武功研究 (Taipei: Guoli gugong bowuyuan, 1982), esp. pp. 23-59, 65-104.

²³ The emperor's attempt to establish cultural hegemony was also evinced in the compilation of the *Siku quanshu* and the literary inquisitions. See Kent Guy, *The Emperor's Four Treasuries: Scholars and the State in the Late Ch'ien-lung Era* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1987), and Luther Goodrich, *The Literary Inquisition of Ch'ien-Lung* (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1966).

had already made considerable effort to employ history as an effective means of ideological control. Since his enthronement, he had energetically initiated several history projects and tried very hard to establish his supreme authority in the field.²⁴ Educated under the Confucian orthodoxy, the emperor thoroughly understood the political function of history and was well aware of the Chinese tradition of making use of history as a tool of commentary on contemporary politics. Since ancient times, Confucian historiography, which emphasized "praise and blame" (*bao bian* 褒貶) of the deeds of historical figures, had gradually been developed as a sharp weapon of political criticism. Living in the tradition, Chinese literati never tired of "using the past to allude to the present 借古喻今,"²⁵ through which they could indirectly express opinions on current issues. In the emperor's eyes, these uncontrolled criticisms of government and its policies by drawing analogies from history were undoubtedly a challenge to the absolute power of the throne. Therefore, he intended to monopolize the authority of "praise and blame" through the compilation of official histories and establish orthodox interpretations of important historical events according to the interests of the Qing house. As Confucius had said, "When right principles [of governance] prevail in the empire, there will be no discussions [on politics] among the common people." Mencius also asserted that in a time of peace and order, it should be the emperor who controls the writing of history.²⁶ With references to these Confucian ideas, the emperor found no difficulty in rationalizing his attempt to write history. From this perspective, the mid-Qianlong reevaluation of the Southern Ming can be regarded as a means employed by the emperor to demonstrate his impartiality in exercising the power of a supreme judge of Chinese history and thus to

²⁴ He, "Qing Gaozong dui Nanming lishi," pp. 1-27; He, "Qing Gaozong gangmuti shiji bianzuan kao," pp. 241-80; Qiao, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu*, pp. 273-91; Ye Gaoshu 葉高樹, "Qianlong shidai guanxiu shishu de jiaohua gongneng: jian lun Qianlong huangdi tongyu Hanren de celie" 乾隆時代官修史書的教化功能兼論乾隆皇帝統御漢人的策略, *Guoli Taiwan shifan daxue lishi xuebao* 國立臺灣師範大學歷史學報 22 (June 1994), pp. 171-99. On the various projects, see Qiao, *Qingchao guanfang shixue yanjiu*, pp. 68-72; and on establishing authority, see He, "Lun Qing Gaozong ziwo chuixu de lishi panguan xingxiang," pp. 146-82.

²⁵ The Qing historian Wan Sitong 萬斯同 (1638-1702) had explained the practical uses of history to statecraft in a letter to his nephew Wan Yan 萬言 (1637-1705), which, to a large extent, represented the popular view of Confucian historians in early Qing; Wan Sitong, *Shiyuan wenji* 石園文集, in Zhang Shouyong 張壽鏞, comp., *Siming congshu di si ji* 四明叢書第四集 (Siming Zhangshi Yueyuan kanben 四明張氏約園刊本, 1936) 7, pp. 435-37.

²⁶ For Confucius' statement, see Yang Bojun 楊伯峻, *Lunyu yizhu* 論語譯注 (Shanghai: Zhonghua, 1958), xv1/2, p. 181; the English is based loosely on that of James Legge, rev. and annot. Liu Zhongde 劉重德 and Luo Zhiye 羅志野, *The Chinese-English Four Books* (Changsha: Hunan, 1992), p. 219. The exact words in Mencius are "春秋，天子之事也"; Yang Bojun, *Mengzi yizhu* 孟子譯注 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1960), vol. 1 (v1/9), p. 155.

conclude the discourse on the history of the resistance as well.²⁷

In a broad sense, the reevaluation could also be viewed as the emperor's continued effort to win public admiration for his Confucian emperorship. Inspired by his grandfather and father, the Qianlong emperor was consciously trying to attain a unity of political authority and ethical truth in ruling the empire. The Kangxi emperor had devoted much of his leisure time to the study of Chinese classics and worked hard to perform his duties according to Confucian principles in order to prove himself a Confucian emperor who embodied the Confucian tradition of governance. Although Yongzheng can hardly be considered a true adherent of Confucianism, he did attempt to present himself as the promoter and defender of Confucian orthodoxy.²⁸ In comparison, Qianlong did not have a keen interest in Chinese classics and metaphysics.²⁹ In pursuit of a self-image of the sage-emperor, he turned to the study of history, which, it was widely acknowledged, Confucius and Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) had made into an efficient tool of moral education. Qianlong governance was indeed a mixture of Confucianism and Legalism.³⁰ However, the emperor claimed that he himself was a Confucian ruler and did not hesitate to perform as a Confucian teacher to his subjects. Through his comments on historical events, as well as on the figures involved, he taught his subjects what social order and moral behavior should be. In this context, the recognition of the heroic and moving deeds of Southern Ming martyrs not only offered valuable sources for

²⁷ The emperor's intention was evinced in his later edicts, which emphasized that his interpretation of late-Ming history was "perfectly impartial and absolute correct" 大公至正; *QLCSYD*, vol. 8, p. 86, pp. 468-69; vol. 10, p. 805; vol. 11, pp. 461-62. Also see *GZSL*, vol. 21, j. 983, pp. 120-21; j. 987, p. 177; j. 996, p. 317; j. 1021, p. 684; vol. 23, j. 1142, p. 294, pp. 309-10; j. 1168, p. 666.

²⁸ Huang Jinxing 黃進興 (Huang Chin-shing), "Qingchu zhengquan yishi xingtai zhi tanjiu: zhengzhi de daotong hua" 清初政權意識型態之探究政治的道統化, in *You ru sheng yu: quanli, xinyang zhengdang xing* 優入聖域權力信仰與正當性 (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua, 1994), pp. 87-124; Huang Chin-shing, *Philosophy, Philology and Politics in Eighteenth-Century China* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1995), pp. 148-55.

²⁹ Harold Kahn, *Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1971), pp. 120-25.

³⁰ In his study of *Leshantang quanji* 樂善堂全集, the Qianlong emperor's early writings on emperorship, Chang Chun-shu has pointed out that although Qianlong advanced a Confucian way of governance, little of this ideal was put into practice and some of the emperor's rulings even violated what he had postulated. Chang, "Emperorship in Eighteenth-Century China," *The Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong* 7.2 (1974), pp. 552-57. By comparing the different editions of the *Leshantang quanji*, Gao Xiang 高翔 affirms that since his enthronement, Qianlong had gradually given up the Confucian ideal of emperorship and in the later part of his reign, legal punishment became an important means to maintain his authority. Gao, *Kang Yong Qian san di tongzhi sixiang yanjiu* 康雍乾三帝統治思想研究 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue, 1995), pp. 303-4.

moral education but also helped show his kindheartedness, which provided strong grounds for the proclamation of neo-Confucian rule.

It should be noted that the emperor's acknowledgement of Southern Ming martyrdom did not imply a departure from the previous Manchu stance concerning Qing legitimacy. On the contrary, the edict of 1766 indicates that the emperor had adopted a new tactic in a continued attempt to invalidate some Han scholars' arguments that challenged the Manchu proclamation. By emphasizing the self-sacrifice of Southern Ming loyalists who kept their Confucian faith in extreme difficulty, it hinted that the anti-Qing movement was doomed to failure. The emperor thought that the fruitless struggle of the loyalists was strong evidence to support the imperial position that the rise of the Manchus was "heaven's will."³¹ He stood firm in defending early-Qing legitimacy. Although later making a small concession to the literati by granting the Hongguang regime a position in official histories, he never stopped attacking prince Fu (also known as the Hongguang emperor [Zhu Yousong 朱由崧, 1607-1646; r. 1644-1645]) for his profligacy and condemning the court factionalism of his short reign.³² Furthermore, in his discussion of the historical positions of other Southern Ming regimes, Qianlong made a deliberate attempt to suppress the topic of royal bloodline from the discourse on dynastic legitimacy. He argued that from any point of view the princes Tang 唐 (Longwu [Zhu Yujian 朱聿鍵, 1602-1646; r. 1645-1646]) and Gui 桂 (Yongli [Zhu Youlang 朱由榔, 1623-1662; r. 1647-1662]) did not qualify to be called emperors because their reigns were short and confined to certain regions of south China as a result of Qing advances.³³ Therefore, he maintained, there should be no doubt that during the Ming-Qing transition, the Mandate of Heaven was on the Manchu side and the Qing dynasty was the only legitimate regime in the Chinese world.

³¹ This intention of the emperor was further evinced later in his policy toward late-Ming literati criticisms of administrative abuses. In 1779 and 1781, he ordered the compilations of *Mingji zoushu* 明季奏疏 and *Ming mingchen zouyi* 明名臣奏議. A number of memorials criticizing late-Ming politics were collected and published, and according to the emperor, one of his aims in compiling the works was to make the causes of the Ming demise known to the public. See Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan, comp., *Zuanxiu Siku quanshu dang'an* 纂修四庫全書檔案 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1997), vol. 1, pp. 1005-7; vol. 2, pp. 1428-39.

³² In the edict of 1766, Qianlong insisted on the previous Manchu assertion that Ming rule had ended in 1644. Later, he made a concession by granting a position to the Hongguang regime in the appendixes of *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*, thus allowing it to share legitimacy with the Qing for the period 1644-45. Consequently, the date of the Ming collapse was then said to be 1645, one year longer than that given in *Mingshi*; Fuheng 傅恆 (d. 1770) et al., comps., *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*, in *SKQS*, vol. 339, j. 116, p. 735.

³³ *QLCSYD*, vol. 4 pp. 896-97; *GZSL*, vol. 18, j. 761, p. 373.

Stressing the moral aspect of Southern Ming martyrdom, the 1766 edict laid an ideological foundation for the later official approach to the resistance and signaled the beginning of a new government policy toward the evaluation of Ming-Qing historical figures. After that, an atmosphere for a full-scale official reevaluation of late-Ming loyalists was gradually developed. It was in such circumstances that the *Zhuchen lu* project was initiated in 1776.³⁴

THE INITIATION OF THE ZHUCHEN LU PROJECT AND ITS STATED AIMS

The initiation of the *Zhuchen lu* compilation was a direct result of the Qianlong emperor's expressions of approval for Ming martyrs at this time. On December 17, 1775, nearly a decade after the imperial recognition of the virtues of Southern Ming loyalists, the emperor instructed the compilers of *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan* to add histories of the Longwu and Yongli reigns as appendices.³⁵ Repeating most of his arguments of 1766, the emperor reaffirmed his post-1766 interpretation of the conquest. Based on this interpretation, he further ordered that except for those who were members of late-Ming cliques or who had previously taken part in rebellions against the late-Ming, the supporters of the Hongguang, Longwu, and Yongli courts should not be condemned and that their moral deeds be recorded in the appendices.³⁶ The edict became a prelude of imperial commendation for Southern Ming martyrdom. On December 31, the emperor issued another edict that openly acknowledged Southern Ming martyrs for loyalty to their dynasty. In the edict, he announced that honorable posthumous

³⁴ Presently, there are several original and reprinted Qianlong editions available. Apart from the popular reprinted edition (Shuhede 舒赫德 [1710-77] et al., comps., *Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu* [rpt.; Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1969; hereafter, *ZCL*]), see also *SKQS*, vol. 456. There is also a 1792 edn. available in the Palace Museum, Taipei; Gugong bowuyuan 故宮博物院, comp., *Gugong suo cang dianben shumu* 故宮所藏殿本書目 (Beiping [Beijing]: Gugong bowuyuan tushuguan, 1933) 2, p. 42; Guoli gugong bowuyuan 國立故宮博物院, comp., *Guoli gugong bowuyuan shanben jiuji zongmu* 國立故宮博物院善本舊籍總目 (Taipei: Guoli gugong bowuyuan, 1983), vol. 1, p. 308. The Qianlong edn. is republished in the *Taiwan wenxian congkan* 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Taipei: Taiwan yinhang, 1971), no. 132, in which *juan* 12 (the "Jingnan" sect.) is deleted.

³⁵ See n. 21, above, on its date of compilation. The 1768 edn. contains 116 *juan*; the *Siku* and later edns. have 120, since the Southern Ming narratives are appended. See Gugong bowuyuan tushuguan 故宮博物院圖書館 and Liaoning sheng tushuguan 遼寧省圖書館, comps., *Qingdai neifu ke shu mulu jieti* 清代內府刻書目錄解題 (Beijing: Zijincheng, 1995), pp. 89-90.

³⁶ *QLCSYD*, vol. 8, pp. 77-78; *GZSL*, vol. 21, j. 995, pp. 300-1.

titles would then be granted to those late-Ming officials who had died for the Ming cause. In explaining his decision, the emperor said:

To praise and reward loyalists is to promote loyalty. Yet, in the previous dynastic transitions [in Chinese history, the new dynasties] seldom praised the [loyalist] officials of the former regimes. It was our Shizu Zhanghuangdi 世祖章皇帝 [the Shunzhi emperor (1638-1661; r. 1644-1661)] who bestowed honorable posthumous titles upon the twenty late-Ming martyrs like Fan Jingwen 范景文 (1587-1644) when the [Qing] dynasty was founded... At that time, only this small number of martyrs was [officially] praised because [the government] could solely rely on the hearsay and had no time to conduct comprehensive investigation [into the late-Ming martyrdom]. With the passing of time, many past events became known and final conclusions were reached. Now, [most deeds of the loyalists] can be found in the *Mingshi*. For example, Shi Kefa, insisting on loyalty, propped up the perilous situation and in the end took his own life as a martyr. Others such as Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周 (1578-1645) and Huang Daozhou, who had the courage to tell the truth in court and did not compromise with villains, gave up their lives for the dynasty in a critical situation. All of them deserve to be regarded as perfect men of the time and should be admired. Many others sacrificed their lives defending their cities, died in battles, or were captured and executed. They faced death without fear... and discharged their duties faithfully. How can [their loyal deeds] be ignored! These figures should be picked out from the histories (*Mingshi* and *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*) and be [officially] commended together.³⁷

In addition, despite the precedents suggesting that official posthumous titles were given only to figures with senior official ranks, the throne ordered the enshrinement of the common people who sacrificed themselves for the fallen dynasty during the Ming-Qing transition.³⁸ In spite of being ineligible to receive any posthumous title, these figures would be enshrined in the temples for loyalists in their home counties for public worship as a kind of commendation. Following the edict, an ad hoc group headed by Shuhede and Yu Minzhong 于敏中 (1714-1780) was established to work out the details. Thus, the imperial policy of commending Southern Ming martyrs was implemented.

³⁷ *QLCSYD*, vol. 8, pp. 86-87; *GZSL*, vol. 21, j. 996, pp. 316-17.

³⁸ According to Wang Shizhen 王士禛 (1634-1711), early in the Qing posthumous titles were only granted to senior ministers; *Chibeitoutan* 池北偶談 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1982), vol. 1, j. 1, p. 25; j. 2, p. 48.

Two months later, a third edict was issued, in which the emperor ordered an extension of the official commendation to incorporate those Ming ministers who died in the resistance against the *coup d'état* of Zhu Di 朱棣 (Yongle 永樂 [1360-1424; r. 1403-1424]), that is, the "Jingnan" struggle of 1399-1403. In the edict, he stated that although Zhu Di took power in 1403, his enthronement was nothing more than usurpation and the resistance to him was righteous. To the Qianlong emperor, the loyalists' refusal to collaborate with the usurper under the threat of death demonstrated their noble quality and moral courage, though some of these martyrs were pedants and their impractical political proposals were partly responsible for the outbreak of the *coup d'état*. Their martyrdom was the embodiment of the Confucian ideal of ministership – loyalty. The emperor said that he was moved by the deeds of these victims, who saw their families exterminated because of their uncompromising attitude, and regretted to see that their moral deeds were ignored during the Ming as a result of government suppression. Therefore, he decided to bestow posthumous titles on them so as to honor their conscientious neo-Confucian loyalty.³⁹

The edict initiating the *Zhuchen lu* project was issued on March 27, 1776; in it was the ad hoc group's proposed list of titles to be commended to the throne after a three-month investigation into the martyrdom of Jingnan and late-Ming loyalists as recorded in several works: *Mingshi*, *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*, *Da Qing yitongzhi* 大清一統志 (*Gazetteer of the Great Unified Qing Empire*), and local gazetteers.⁴⁰ Adopting the proposal, Qianlong resolved to carry out a comprehensive project on Ming martyrdom so as to make known the moral courage of these loyalists.⁴¹ As a result of the edict, the compilation work began.

According to the emperor's proclamation, the motives behind the project were both political and ethical. First, it was intended to glorify the

³⁹ *QLCSYD*, vol. 8, pp. 128-29; *GZSL*, vol. 21, 1000, pp. 385-86; *YZSWQZ*, vol. 6, 33, pp. 805-6. For a discussion on the changing concept of loyalty in imperial China, see Wang Gung-wu, "Feng Tao: An Essay on Confucian Loyalty," in Arthur F. Wright, ed., *Confucianism and Chinese Civilization* (Stanford: Stanford U.P., 1959), pp. 188-210. Also see James T. C. Liu, "Yüeh Fei (1103-1141) and China's Heritage of Loyalty," *Journal of Asian Studies* 31.2 (Feb. 1972), pp. 291-97; Kwang-ching Liu, "Socioethics as Orthodoxy: A Perspective," *idem*, ed., *Orthodoxy in Late Imperial China*, (Berkeley: U. California P., 1990), pp. 90-100; and Richard Davis, *Wind Against the Mountain: The Crisis of Politics and Culture in Thirteenth-Century China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1996), pp. 5-25.

⁴⁰ Yongrong, *Siku quanshu zongmu*, vol. 1, j. 58, p. 526, claims the project was initiated in 1776; but Qinggui, *Guochao gongshi xubian* 90, p. 878, dates it as 1775. Obviously, the latter confused the date of commendation with the date of the project.

⁴¹ *QLCSYD*, vol. 8, pp. 142-43; *GZSL*, vol. 21, j. 1002, p. 418.

Ming martyrs so as to encourage those who took office to follow suit in their loyalty. In addition, it was also believed that the imperial redress for the resistance activists would "foster the cardinal principles and constant virtues 扶植綱常" in order to maintain a harmonious social order. The emperor was confident that the official admiration of their deaths, together with the compilation of *Zhuchen lu*, would clearly demonstrate his "perfect impartiality and absolute correctness" in examining the conquest. He believed that this would also establish an official guideline for the future writing of the history.⁴²

To a certain extent, the compilation represented an imperial endorsement of the early-Qing historians' ethical interpretation of the resistance as well as a government concession to the popular demand of the Han Chinese literati for an imperial reevaluation of Southern Ming figures. In fact, the emperor adopted in his edicts most of the arguments put forth by the Qing scholars in the previous discourses on loyalty, in particular the ideas of those scholar-officials who had worked for the official *Mingshi* project. However, the Qianlong emperor's appreciation of Southern Ming loyalists was not a one-sided compromise. The concession notwithstanding, the emperor also tried to make use of the policy to reaffirm the Cheng-Zhu Confucian doctrine that absolute submission of ministers to the throne was an indispensable element contributing to the concept of loyalty. While the Qing literati considered those who "did not serve two dynasties" as loyalists, regardless of whether they were martyrs or Ming "remnants" (*yimin* 遺民),⁴³ the emperor, on the contrary, admired only the former and emphasized their embodiment of the principle of "never changing allegiance even unto death 有死無貳."⁴⁴ With the aim of directing public opinion, the emperor, on the one hand, paid respect to the martyrs but, on the other hand, seriously criticized the *yimin* for not giving their lives for the Ming.⁴⁵ Obviously, by praising the former and blaming the latter, he attempted to make use of the official activity of commendation as a driving force for promoting absolute loyalty in society.

⁴² *ZCL*, vol. 1, Qianlong's preface, pp. 5-9.

⁴³ Quan, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 2, j. 42, p. 1651. Also see He Guanbiao, *Sheng yu si: Mingji shidafu de jueze* 生與死明季士大夫的抉擇 (Taipei: Lianjing, 1997), pp. 97-124; Zhao Yuan, "Ming Qing zhi ji shiren zhi si yiji youguan si de huati" 明清之際士人之死以及有關死的話題, *Xueren* 學人 6 (Sept. 1994), pp. 113-43; Zhao Yuan 趙園, *Ming-Qing zhi ji shidafu yanjiu* 明清之際士大夫研究 (Beijing: Beijing daxue, 1999), pp. 23-49.

⁴⁴ *QLCSYD*, vol. 8, pp. 77-78; *GZSL*, vol. 21, j. 995, p. 301.

⁴⁵ *QLCSYD*, vol. 8, pp. 86-87; *GZSL*, vol. 21, j. 996, p. 318.

THE SELECTION CRITERIA AND PROCESS

In a memorial of March 27, 1776, the ad hoc group suggested selection criteria for *Zhuchen lu* the intent of which displayed subservience to the imperial will.⁴⁶ They proposed that the posthumous titles granted to loyal Ming officials be broadly divided into two categories, the "individual honorable titles (*zhuan shi* 專謚)" and the "general honorable titles (*tong shi* 通謚)," and that the former be granted to those who had lofty virtues or profound contributions, and the latter to others. To avoid duplication, it was suggested that martyrs who had already earned posthumous titles offered by the Ming government before 1644 and the Qing government in 1633 be excluded from the commendation lists.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, any Southern Ming posthumous title said to be inappropriate due to factional bias would be abolished. The deeds of these figures would be carefully reexamined and new titles would be granted accordingly after review.

In order to make the Ming martyrs known to the public, it was proposed that when an official posthumous title was granted to a commended martyr, the title should be recorded in his memorial tablet, which would be enshrined in the memorial temple for loyalists located in his home county. Two lists of commended martyrs, the *zhuan shi* and *tong shi*, together with brief accounts of their deeds, would be prepared by the Department of Rites and distributed to the provinces and counties concerned. Descendants of the enshrined martyrs were allowed to use this official information to write epitaphs of their ancestors. If the native place of the martyr was unknown, he was to be enshrined in the temple of the county he last served. For those junior officers, laymen, the nameless, and females, who gave their lives for the fallen dynasty, although no posthumous title would be given, their memorial tablets were also to be placed in the temples for public memory and worship.

Observing the instructions of the emperor, the ad hoc group suggested that not all former officials who had died for the Ming cause be commended. At least three types of figures were to be excluded: those who had previously associated with late-Ming cliques; those who had surrendered to other rebels before taking part in the resistance to the Qing; and those who had submitted to the Qing before committing suicide. The ad hoc

⁴⁶ *QLCSYD*, vol. 8, pp. 142-43; *GZSL*, vol. 21, j. 1002, pp. 417-18; *ZCL*, vol. 1, "Memorial," pp. 15-32.

⁴⁷ Although it was not mentioned in the memorial, the martyrs given posthumous titles during the Shunzhi period were also excluded from the *Zhuchen lu*.

group argued that these three types could hardly be regarded as loyalists according to a strict standard, and it was important that their deaths could not wipe out the offenses or faults they had committed during their careers.

Last but not least, the proposal dealt with the matter of sources. Members of the ad hoc group went through the official *Mingshi* and *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan* and came to the conclusion that the government's evaluation of martyrs should be based on the official accounts in these two works. To ensure that all known martyrs were included in the project, they recommended cross-referencing *Da Qing yitong zhi* and local gazetteers. Chief censor Zhang Ruogui 張若淮 (d. 1787) had previously advised the emperor that a half-year, nation-wide investigation into Southern Ming martyrs be conducted, but his advice was rejected after discussion. Insisting on the authority of official historiographical works, the group argued that the accuracy and comprehensiveness of *Mingshi* and other sources were unquestionable. Furthermore, it was believed that the use of private sources would inevitably arouse problems of fraudulent claims. The compilers also worried that a nation-wide investigation would not necessarily bring more information but would surely disturb the daily lives of the people.⁴⁸ The compilers' strong objection to Zhang's suggestion is understandable because a large-scale research would bring additional work and might present them with the problem of having to read the emperor's mind in the evaluation of historical figures.

It seemed that the Qianlong emperor very much agreed with the ideas of the ad hoc group. Convinced by their arguments, he adopted the proposal without any amendment. The *Zhuchen lu* project was then carried out.

Taxonomy and Contents

Since all necessary materials were already collected from *Mingshi* and *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan* before the group submitted its proposal, it took only about a month to complete the project. The short duration suggested that little time had been spent on further materials from official histories. Most likely, the major work of the compilers was to verify and edit these materials and then rearrange them in an order of status according to the previously set criteria of *zhuan shi* and *tong shi*. It seems that the emperor was highly satisfied with the product. Receiving the final draft, he granted an imperial preface with a poem to the work.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ *ZCL*, vol. 1, "Memorial," pp. 33-38.

⁴⁹ *ZCL*, vol. 1, Preface, pp. 1-2; *YZSWQJ*, vol. 6, j. 35, p. 830.

Zhuchen lu recorded the martyrdom of a total of 3,717 individuals. This included 1,759 posthumous titles offered to officials and gentry who were Jingnan or Southern Ming loyalists.⁵⁰ Among these, 33 received individual honorable titles and 124 were given a general honorable title of *zhonglie* 忠烈 (loyalty and bravery), 120 *zhongjie* 忠節 (loyalty and integrity), 599 *liemin* 烈愍 (bravery and commiseration), and 883 *jiemin* 節愍 (integrity and commiseration). Apart from these, a total of 1,958 junior officers and common people were officially praised without any posthumous title.⁵¹ The details are presented in table 1.

Table 1. *Ming Martyrs Praised and Posthumous Titles Granted in Zuchen lu*

Source: *ZCL*; figures for attached family members not included.

	LATE-MING MARTYR	JINGNAN MARTYR	ROW TOTALS
Individual title	26	7	33
(subtotals)	26	7	33)
General titles:			
<i>zhonglie</i>	113	11	124
<i>zhongjie</i>	107	13	120
<i>liemin</i>	574	25	599
<i>jiemin</i>	840	43	883
(subtotals)	1,634	92	1,726)
No title granted:			
<i>Junior officer</i>	495	16	511
<i>Layman</i>	1,434	13	1,447
(subtotals)	1,929	29	1,958)
Column Totals	3,589	128	3,717

of *zhonglie*, *zhongjie*, *liemin*, or *jiemin*, and junior officers as well as common people who were enshrined in local temples for loyalists. In the late-Ming section, the spaces of the eleven *juan* are distributed to these seven different categories in the following sequences:

⁵⁰ For a long period of time, there was a misconception that all persons recorded in *Zhuchen lu* received posthumous titles. For instance, Wu Zhenyu 吳振毓 (1792-1871) asserted that 3,600 late-Ming martyrs gained their titles in the Qianlong commendation; *Yanjizhai conglu* 養吉齋叢錄 (Beijing: Beijing guji 1983) 12, p. 145.

⁵¹ *Zhuchen lu* occasionally miscounts: in some *juan*, the total number mentioned in the preface does not match with the actual figures recorded. *Siku quanshu zongmu*, and *Qingchao tongzhi* 清朝通志 also give incorrect figures of certain categories; Yongrong, *Siku quanshu zongmu*, vol. 1, j. 58, p. 526; *Qingchao tongzhi*, in *Shitong* 十通 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji 1988) 53, pp. 7063-69. The figures employed here are based on my own count.

1. individual posthumous title, *juan* 1;
2. general posthumous title of *zhonglie*, *juan* 2;
3. general posthumous title of *zhongjie*, *juan* 3;
4. general posthumous title of *liemin*, *juan* 4-5;
5. general posthumous title of *jiemin*, *juan* 6-8;
6. enshrined junior officer, *juan* 9; and
7. enshrined common people, *juan* 10-11.

All biographical sketches in *Zhuchen lu* are drafted in a standard format. Each martyr receives a brief account of his rank, native place, and deeds of martyrdom, with references to *Mingshi*, *Yupi lidai tongjian jilan*, *Da Qing yitong zhi*, or local gazetteers. If the martyrdom involved his family members, names of the members concerned were also recorded as attachments. For those receiving individual posthumous titles, official remarks praising their virtues, together with the bestowed title, are attached at the end of the biographical sketch. For example, in the case of He Fengsheng 賀逢聖 (d. 1642), who took his own life in the resistance against the late-Ming rebels and was given an individual posthumous title of *zhongque* 忠愍 (loyalty and honesty), *Zhuchen lu* states:

He Fengsheng, grand secretary of the Wenyuan Palace and chief minister of the Department of Revenue, was a native of Jiangxia. He was an honest and loyal official who retired due to sickness. Captured by Zhang Xianzhong's 張獻忠 (1606-1646) bandits during their occupation of Wuchang in 1642, he refused to surrender. He committed suicide by drowning himself in a lake in his official robes. His wife Madame Wei 危 [then] drowned herself in a pond. His sons Jinming 覲明, Guangming 光明, daughters-in-law Madame Zeng 曾, Madame Chen 陳, and three grandsons also took their own lives in similar ways. ... As He Fengsheng was a man of orthodox learning and upright behavior who sacrificed his life for integrity, an [individual] posthumous title *zhongque* is granted to him.⁵²

The sketches for those receiving general posthumous titles and laymen are placed in the *juan* under a title specifying the category they belong to. In most cases, the accounts are extremely brief, usually containing only a paragraph or even a sentence. In the account regarding Liu Shu 劉曙 (d. 1645), who was placed in the list of those granted the general posthumous title of *jiemin*, *Zhuchen lu* reads:

⁵² *ZCL*, vol. 1, j. 1, p. 49.

Liu Shu was a native of Changzhou, who was appointed magistrate of Nanchang county after earning a *jinshi* degree. Before he took the post, Nanjing fell [into the hands of the Qing] and he committed suicide.⁵³

The biographical sketches in each category of the late-Ming section are basically grouped and arranged in sequence according to the histories of martyrdom concerned:

1. martyrdom in the pre-1644 Sino-Manchu conflicts;
2. martyrdom during Li Zicheng's capture of Beijing in 1644;
3. martyrdom in the Southern Ming resistance movements (Hongguang; Longwu; Lu; and Yongli); and
4. victims who resisted the late-Ming rebellions.

The distribution of different categories and groups in the late-Ming section and their proportion to the *Zhuchen lu* totals are summarized in tables 2 and 3.

Table 2. Distribution of Late-Ming Biographical Sketches in *Zhuchen lu*

Source: ZCL; figures for attached family members not included.

	MARTYRS: INDIVIDUAL TITLE	MARTYRS: GENERAL TITLE	MARTYRS: NO TITLE	ROW TOTALS (%)
Pre-1644 Sino-Manchu conflicts	10	266	165	441 (12.3)
1644 Incident	0	110	175	285 (7.9)
Southern Ming resistance:				
<i>Hongguang</i>	9	91	108	
<i>Longwu</i>	3	109	81	
<i>Lu</i>	1	50	6	
<i>Yongli</i>	3	160	146	
(subtotals)	16	410	341	767 (21.4)
Resistance against rebellions	0	848	1,248	2,096 (58.4)
Column Totals	26	1,634	1,929	3,589 (100)

⁵³ ZCL, vol. 1, j. 6, p. 365.

The proportion of Southern Ming court martyrs in the late-Ming section is worth noting. Although most of the known martyrs who died loyally for Southern Ming courts are incorporated in the lists, they nonetheless form only one-fifth of the total biographical sketches. As table 2 shows, these 767 cases of anti-Qing activists account for 21.4% of the total number of sketches for the praised late-Ming loyalists (3,589). Their proportion

drops to 20.6% if the 128 cases of the Jingnan martyrs are added to the base (table 3). The official project collected a great number of late-Ming loyalists who never took part in the resistance movements led by Southern Ming princes. In the late-Ming section, the majority (58.4%) of the sketches comes from victims of local resistance against the late-Ming rebellions. Category 1, above, totals 441 (12.3%) and category 2 totals 285 (7.9%), together accounting for

20.2%. The relatively low proportion of post-1644 anti-Qing activists distinguishes *Zhuchen lu* from late-seventeenth-century private historiography.

Generally speaking, during the late-seventeenth century, private works in memory of late-Ming martyrs, either by Ming *yimin* or Qing scholars, placed considerable emphasis on Southern Ming martyrdom and therefore preserved a higher proportion of biographies for the anti-Qing activists of 1644-1662. For instance, in *Xuejiaoting zhengqi ji* 雪交亭正氣集 (*Collected Records of Righteousness from the Xuejiao Pavilion*) (in twelve *juan*) compiled by the *yimin* scholar Gao Yutai 高宇泰, the proportion of post-1644 anti-Qing figures is over 90%. Because the work of Gao was influenced by his anti-Qing attitude, except the first *juan*, which is for the martyrs of the 1644 fall of Beijing, almost all the *juan* are dedicated to those who died loyally for the Southern Ming regimes against Manchu invasion.⁵⁴ Qu Dajun's 屈大均 (1630-1696) *Huang Ming sichao chengren lu* 皇明四朝成仁錄 (*Records of the Martyrdom of the Four Imperial Ming Courts*) is another valuable reference provided by the Ming *yimin*. Qu's work covers the period from 1628 to

Table 3. Distribution and Proportion of Late-Ming Biog. Sketches in *Zhuchen lu*

Source: ZCL

TYPES OF MARTYR	NUMBER	PERCENT
Pre-1644	441	11.9
1644 incident	285	7.7
So. Ming resistance	767	20.6
Rebellion resistance	2,096	56.4
Jingnan	128	3.4
Total	3,717	100

⁵⁴ Gao Yutai, *Xuejiaoting zhengqi ji*, in *Taiwan wenxian congkan* 臺灣文獻叢刊 286 (Taipei: Taiwan yinhang, 1970), j. 2-12, pp. 29-198.

1662, thus the martyrdom of the Southern Ming reigns carries a great weight; the author devotes half of his writings to brief accounts of the deeds of the anti-Qing activists of 1644–1662.⁵⁵ Even in *Mingmo zhonglie jishi* 明末忠烈紀實 (*True Accounts of the Late-Ming Martyrs*), the work of the early-Qing scholar-official Xu Bingyi 徐秉義 (1633–1711), there is an equal proportion of biographies of victims of the late-Ming rebellions and martyrs of Southern Ming courts.⁵⁶ The dominant proportion of Southern Ming martyrs in such works indicates the cultural significance of Southern Ming martyrdom in the early-Qing intellectual discourse on loyalty. To Han Chinese, especially the literati, the martyrdom of the resistance activists, in particular those active after 1644, was an embodiment of moral integrity and courage – inseparable parts of Confucian culture.

Unlike Gao, Qu, and Xu, the compilers of *Zhuchen lu*, in compliance with the instructions of the Qianlong emperor, placed the focus of official commendation on Ming loyalism in general. The work deliberately incorporated a huge number of late-Ming victims who died in local resistance against rebellions and consequently reduced the proportion of anti-Qing activists. The incorporation of the Jingnan martyrs further extends the scope of the project from the late-Ming period to the entire Ming dynasty. Undoubtedly, these arrangements are closely related to the imperial policy of promoting neo-Confucian ideology through a campaign of mass commendations for loyalty. However, to a certain extent, these also reveal the emperor's deliberate attempt to divert public attention from the sensitive history of Manchu invasion and ethnic conflicts after 1644. By incorporating both the Jingnan martyrs and local victims who were usually neglected in previous late-Ming private biographies, the *Zhuchen lu* project eventually achieved an intended balance between admiring the Southern Ming martyrs for their moral quality and preventing these anti-Qing figures from gaining dominance in the official commendations.

As a product of official historiography relying heavily upon the same sources as *Mingshi*, *Zhuchen lu* takes a Qing perspective and adopts a tactful approach in handling the narratives of Southern Ming martyrdom even though they touched on taboos of Ming-Qing history. Like *Mingshi*, most of the Southern Ming biographies cautiously avoid mentioning the events con-

cerning the persecutions of anti-Qing activists. For instance, in the case of Zhang Huangyan 張煌言 (1620–1664), a martyr of the Lu 魯 and Yongli regimes who received the general posthumous title of *zhonglie*, *Zhuchen lu* states:

Zhang Huangyan, grand secretary of the East Palace and chief minister of the Department of War, was a native of Yin county. At the beginning, Zhang, being a *juren* 舉人, brought the memorials [of the Zhejiang gentry] to welcome prince Lu to Shaoxing as regent and with his troops followed [the prince] to flee overseas. Later, prince Gui [the Yongli emperor] remotely appointed him as grand secretary. When [the Yongli court] was quelled in Yunnan, [Zhang] dismissed his troops and lived as a hermit in Xuan'ao. Captured by the [Qing] army, he refused to submit and was killed.⁵⁷

A diehard Ming loyalist, Zhang was active in the coastal regions of Zhejiang and Fujian during from 1645 to 1662 and was best known for his northern expedition to Nanjing with Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功 (1624–1662) in 1659. Available sources indicate that because of Zhang's uncompromising attitude, all members of his family, except his daughter, who had married into the Quan family of Yin county, were detained at that point in time by the Qing government as hostages. A number of his relatives were implicated in the incident. Zhang's wife and son were jailed for more than ten years and both were executed with him in 1664.⁵⁸ Of course, these historical facts were deliberately skipped in *Zhuchen lu*.

In the case of Hou Dongzeng 侯峒曾 (1591–1645), one of the key figures of the Jiading resistance movement of 1645, who was given the general posthumous title of *zhongjie* in the Qianlong commendation, the biographical sketch says:

Hou Dongzeng, vice-commissioner of the Office of Transmission, was a native of Jiading. When Nanjing fell, he raised an army to defend his own county. Under the fierce attack of [Qing] troops, the defenders were ex-

⁵⁷ ZCL, vol. 1, j. 2, p. 84.

⁵⁸ Zhang recorded the northern expedition of 1659 in *Beizheng lu* 北征錄; *Zhang Cangshui ji* 張蒼水集 (Shanghai: Guji, 1985), pp. 192–202. For the details given about his family, see Chen Yongming 陳永明 (Chan Wing-ming), "Quan Zuwang zumu Zhang ruren kao" 全祖望族母張孺人考, *Gugong xueshu jikan* 故宮學術季刊 12.1 (Autumn 1994), pp. 133–39; *Ming Qing shiliao* 明清史料, ser. 5 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1959), vol. 1, pp. 152–162; Zhang, *Zhang Cangshui ji*, pp. 157–60 and p. 162; Huang Zongxi, *Huang Zongxi quanji* 黃宗羲全集, ed. Wu Guang 吳光 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji, 1985–94), vol. 10, j. 285; Zha Jizuo 查繼佐 (1601–1676), *Zuiwei lu* 罪惟錄 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji, 1986) 9, p. 1564; and Quan, *Jieqiting ji*, vol. 1, j. 9, pp. 180–98.

⁵⁵ Qu Dajun, *Huang Ming sichao chengren lu*, in Ou Chu 歐初 and Wang Guichen 王貴忱, eds., *Qu Dajun quanji* 屈大均全集 (Beijing: Renmin wuxue, 1996), vol. 3, j. 7–12, pp. 729–949.

⁵⁶ Xu Bingyi, *Mingmo zhonglie jishi* (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji, 1987) 12–18, pp. 185–386; 20, pp. 417–60.

hausted and the city was captured. Dongzeng and his two sons, Yuanyan 元演 (Xuanyan 玄演) and Yuanjie 元潔 (Xuanjie 玄潔), committed suicide by drowning themselves in a well after visiting their ancestor temple.⁵⁹

According to other reliable sources, when Hou Dongzeng's body was found, Qing soldiers, angered at his desperate struggle, cut his head off and exposed it to the public.⁶⁰

In the biographical sketch of Wang Yi 王翊 (1616-1651), an anti-Qing activist in Zhejiang who was granted the general title of *liemin*, we read:

Wang Yi, minister of war and censor-in-chief, was a native of Yuyao. When prince Lu fled overseas, he raised an army at Siming Mountain. [Wang] was defeated and captured [by Qing troops]. Refusing to submit, he was killed.⁶¹

As in the sketches of Zhang Huangyan and Hou Dongzeng, *Zhuchen lu* does not mention that when Wang was captured, he was shot to death by arrows as a penalty for his resistance.⁶² In fact, many martyrs of the resistance movements also suffered the savagery of Qing troops but none of these is narrated in *Zhuchen lu*, not to mention the massacres that occurred in the conquered regions during the Ming-Qing transition.⁶³ In the accounts of Southern Ming loyalists, even concrete acts of resistance to the Qing that might have aroused ethnic hatred were intentionally omitted. The compilers carefully skipped events about the Manchu-Han political conflict during the dynastic change and put the emphasis on the martyrs' hardships that reflected their moral commitment to the fallen dynasty.

Those narratives regarding late-Ming victims who died in the rebellions constitute a sharp contrast to the intentional omissions just mentioned. Sketches of these victims tend to highlight deeds reflecting their moral courage, especially their uncompromising attitude and condemnation of the rebels after being captured. The biographical sketches of Yang Chengxiu 楊呈秀 (d. 1634), Cao Tong 曹同 (d. 1635), and Hong Fachen 洪法臣 (d. 1633) provide typical examples:

⁵⁹ ZCL, vol. 1, 3, p. 125.

⁶⁰ Zhu Zisu 朱子素, *Jiading tucheng jilue* 嘉定屠城紀略, in *Yangzhou shiri ji* 揚州十日記, printed in *Zhongguo lishi yanjiu ziliao congshu* 中國歷史研究資料叢書 (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian 1982), p. 262; Gao, *Xuejiaoting zhengqi ji*, vol. 2, p. 55; Huang Zongxi, *Hongguang shilu chao* 弘光朝實錄鈔, in *Huang Zongxi quanji*, vol. 2, p. 101.

⁶¹ ZCL, vol. 1, j. 4, p. 195.

⁶² Quan, *Jiqiting ji waibian*, vol. 1, j. 4, p. 809.

⁶³ Zhu, *Jiading tucheng jilue*, pp. 260-69; *Yangzhou shiri ji* 揚州十日記, pp. 229-43.

Yang Chengxiu, magistrate of Shunqing, was a native of Huayin county. Having been rated inadequate and dismissed [after nine years' service, he] returned to his home county. When bandits attacked [Huayin] in 1634, he assisted the magistrate in defending the county and was captured after the failure of the resistance. He reviled the rebels and was dismembered...⁶⁴

Cao Tong (or Cao Tongsheng), magistrate of Xunxi, was a native of Chao county. In 1635, when the city was seized, the bandits asked him for the [magistrate's] seal but he reviled them and refused to hand it over. The bandits beat Cao to death, smashing his flesh and bones to pulp.⁶⁵

Hong Fachen was a *bagong* 拔貢 student of You county. In 1633, when the rebel general Zhang Kecheng 張克成 looted [You] with his troops, [Hong] was captured. He reviled the rebels until he was killed.⁶⁶

Similar accounts are easily found in the sketches concerning other late-Ming victims. The striking contrast must have conveyed an important message to the public. In the official memory of late-Ming martyrs and in the Qianlong commendation for Ming martyrdom, the Manchu-Han ethnic conflict, even after a century, was still a taboo that was best eliminated from any official record. Moreover, *Zhuchen lu* revealed the imperial policy of handling the history of the Ming-Qing transition. The Qing court was prepared to make some concessions to the Han Chinese on the evaluation of late-Ming resistance figures, in the hope that such a compromise would promote loyalty among its subjects. Nonetheless, any narrative of the issues that might threaten empire-wide ethnic reconciliation was forbidden. This was further evinced in the government censorship of private writings concerning the conquest.

QIANLONG COMMENDATION AND CENSORSHIP

It should be noted that the imperial commendation for the loyalty of late-Ming martyrs did not imply the government's tolerance of their anti-Qing political ideas. On the contrary, the official recognition of their martyrdom was accompanied by a censorship of their writings. Ironically, most of the works of these Ming loyalists did not escape the Qianlong book bans of the 1770s and 1780s.

Zhuchen lu was compiled during a general time of government censorship concerning the history of the Ming-Qing transition. As Kent Guy's

⁶⁴ ZCL, vol. 1, j. 5, p. 226. ⁶⁵ ZCL, vol. 1, j. 7, p. 419. ⁶⁶ ZCL, vol. 2, j. 11, p. 716.

study indicates, the Qing literary inquisitions were systematized under the name of the *Siku* 四庫 project during the mid-Qianlong period and reached its zenith in the early 1780s.⁶⁷ Through a nation-wide campaign of book collection and scrutiny, many “seditious materials,” at least 3,000 titles (comprising 60–70,000 volumes), concerning Manchu origins and Sino-Manchu conflicts were banned and destroyed.⁶⁸ Needless to say, the chief purpose of censorship was to suppress anti-Manchu sentiment. This intention was disclosed in the emperor’s edict of September 10, 1774:

There are many unofficial histories of the late-Ming with arbitrary praise and blame as well as deviating narratives. Among them, there must be some words offending our [Qing] dynasty. [During the book-collection campaign of the *Siku* project, these works] should be totally banned and destroyed so as to suppress heresies and straighten out people’s minds and social customs.⁶⁹

The imperial order to ban books was applied not only to historiographical works but also to individual collections of prose and poetry by late-Ming and early-Qing authors. Usually, when the collected books were suspected of containing seditious elements they were carefully scrutinized by provincial officials. The suspect materials were submitted to the throne with the officials’ reports and recommendations. With reference to the reports and sometimes to his own reading, the emperor would resolve whether these books should be partly or completely banned and destroyed. Although the campaign in fact had very little effect on the survival of historical works,⁷⁰ a number of written works of the loyalists, including those of the praised martyrs, were prohibited from open circulation for decades under the order.⁷¹ The extant sources on the bans strongly suggest that the government

did not encourage the circulation of the writings on sensitive topics by any of those commended as martyrs. For instance, Liu Zongzhou, the respected neo-Confucian scholar of the late-Ming, was considered by the emperor as a great literatus and moral example and granted an individual posthumous title of *zhongjie*, but his published memorials, suffused with of strong anti-Manchu sentiment, were completely banned.⁷²

Some late-Ming sources with propaganda value received a different treatment. In December of 1776, the Qianlong emperor read the memorials of Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼 (1569–1625 or 1573–1625), the late-Ming general of Liaodong who was framed by his political opponents and executed by the Ming court. Moved by Xiong’s loyalty to the Ming, he thought that the case of Xiong and the fate of other victims of factionalism, such as Yang Lian 楊漣 (1572–1625), Zuo Guangdou 左光斗 (1575–1625) and Ni Yuanlu 倪元璐 (1594–1644), amply demonstrated the late-Ming problems of political corruption and fully explained why heaven’s will shifted from Ming to Qing in 1644. Therefore, he instructed the officials responsible for the book-banning campaign to approve the works of these victims, especially their criticism of late-Ming maladministration. Of course, words of offending the Manchus were changed or deleted.⁷³

In January of 1777, two anthologies of late-Ming political writings entitled *Mingmo zhuchen zoushu* 明末諸臣奏疏 (*Memorials of Late-Ming Officials*) and *Tongshi shanglunlu* 同時尚論錄 (*A Record of Popular Views of Contemporaries*) were submitted by the officials of Jiangsu with the recommendation that they be destroyed. However, as the emperor decided to make use of late-Ming sources to legitimize Qing rule, he ordered that these two anthologies be edited and rearranged. All sensitive materials, as well as those writings of collaborators, were deleted from the original editions and the revised editions of both works were released.⁷⁴ By commending the late-Ming martyrs but eliminating the influence of their anti-Manchu sentiment, the Qing house demonstrated its resolve to reshape the social memory of the Ming-Qing dynastic change. To the rulers, the memory of the late-Ming martyrs was an appreciation of their loyalism, which should not involve any discourse on Manchu-Han ethnic conflicts of the seventeenth century.

⁶⁷ Guy, *Emperor’s Four Treasuries*, pp. 157–200. Also see Huang Aiping 黃愛平, *Siku quanshu zuanxiu yanjiu* 四庫全書纂修研究 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue, 1989), pp. 40–68.

⁶⁸ Sun Dianqi 孫殿起 (1894–1958), *Qingdai jinshu zhi jian lu* 清代禁書知見錄 (Taipei: Shijie shuju, 1960), preface, p. 1. Also see Liu Jiaju 劉家駒, “Qing Gaozong zuanxiu Siku quanshu yu jinhui shuji” 清高宗纂修四庫全書與禁燬書籍, *Dalu zazhi* 大陸雜誌 75.2 (Aug. 1987), pp. 3–21; 75.3 (Sept. 1987), pp. 6–18; and Liu Jiaju, “Zuanxiu Siku quanshu de ling yimian” 纂輯四庫全書的另一面, *Gugong wenwu yuekan* 故宮文物月刊 4.5 (Aug. 1986), pp. 130–36.

⁶⁹ Zhongguo diyi lishi Dang’anguan, *Zuanxiu Siku quanshu dang’an*, vol. 1, p. 240.

⁷⁰ Lynn Struve, “Southern Ming History and Southern Ming Historiography,” paper presented at the International Conference on Southern Ming Historiography in Shanghai, 1991, p. 8; Timothy Brook, “Censorship in Eighteenth-Century China: A View from the Book Trade,” *Canadian Journal of History* 22 (August 1988), pp. 177–96.

⁷¹ For the details, see Yao Jinyuan, ed., *Qingdai jin hui shumu* 清代禁燬書目 (Shanghai: Shangwu, 1957); Sun, *Qingdai jinshu zhi jian lu*; and Lei Mengchen 雷夢辰, *Qingdai gesheng jinshu huikao* 清代各省禁書彙考 (Beijing: Shumu wenxian, 1989).

⁷² Yao, *Qingdai jin hui shumu*, p. 12.

⁷³ *QLCSYD*, vol. 8, pp. 468–69; *GZSL*, vol. 21, j. 1021, pp. 683–85.

⁷⁴ *QLCSYD*, vol. 8, pp. 479–80; *GZSL*, in *QSL*, vol. 21, j. 1022, pp. 693–94. *Mingmo zhuchen zoushu* was extended to incorporate the memorials of the previous reigns and renamed as *Qinding Ming chen zoushu* 欽定明臣奏疏 in 1781. See *Siku quanshu zongmu* 55, pp. 502–3.

In this sense, the compilation of *Zhuchen lu* was consistent with the Qianlong censorship of writings on the transitional period. If the latter indicates the government restriction of discourse on the conquest, then the former, like other official historiographical projects, represents the official perspective of how this history should be told. Obviously, the emperor intended to use these projects as models for future writings on the history of the fall of the Ming and the rise of the Qing.

THE PROJECT AS AN IMPERIAL CONCESSION TO THE HAN CHINESE

In imperial China, granting posthumous titles to the dead was one of the rituals employed by the ruler to guide the public in moral behavior.⁷⁵ As the Qianlong emperor stated in his edict of 1766, "to praise and reward loyalists is to promote loyalty" in society. In response to a century-long demand of the literati for an official recognition of Southern Ming martyrs, the emperor, in a period of political stability and economic prosperity, decided it was high time to alter the previous imperial policy and recognize the Confucian virtues of the resistance activists in order to make the commemoration of these victims a tool of ideology. In one sense, the official reinterpretation of the resistance and the commendation of its martyrs could be regarded as a concession of the Qing house to the Han Chinese. Nevertheless, it was also a deliberate attempt of the emperor to direct the intellectual discourse on the neo-Confucian ideas of loyalty.

A direct product of this program of commendations, *Zhuchen lu* clearly reveals the Qianlong emperor's tactics in manipulating discourse. By singling out martyrs and ignoring *yimin* in the official commendation, the ruler tried to reinforce the idea that absolute submission to the throne was an essential moral quality of a loyalist. Moreover, through its selection criteria in determining whether a martyr should be praised, the project also taught the public that loyalty, as a virtue, required a lifetime commitment, any violation of which would disqualify a minister from being called a loyalist. In addition, the granting of posthumous titles, together with the hierarchical arrangement of the biographical sketches, clearly indicated the imperial standard of moral evaluation, which, according to the emperor, could be applied not only to historical figures but also to those Qing sub-

jects living in the mid-Qianlong era and in future generations.

From the imperial perspective, in treating the resistance and in the admiration of its martyrs not all the matters were worth commemorating. Therefore, it was the emperor who held the ultimate authority to decide which figures and events should be commended and recorded. Under these presuppositions, the Qianlong emperor, through the taxonomy and narrative strategies of the *Zhuchen lu* project, tried to give an official definition of loyalty and make it the imperial principle of "praise and blame," which, to him, was tantamount to an authoritative guideline for future historical works.

In this sense, if the Qianlong reevaluation of Southern Ming martyrs was a victory for the Han Chinese literati by gaining a Qing compromise over Confucian ideas, it also cost them a considerable price. In exchange for an imperial concession, they gave tacit consent to government dominance in the intellectual discourse on Confucian virtues.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

GZSL	<i>Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu</i> 高宗純皇帝實錄
QLCSYD	<i>Qianlong chao shangyu dang</i> 乾隆朝上諭檔
QSL	<i>Qing shilu</i> 清實錄
SKQS	<i>Yingyin Wenyuange siku quanshu</i> 影印文淵閣四庫全書
SZSL	<i>Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu</i> 世祖章皇帝實錄
YZSWQJ	<i>Qing Gaozong (Qianlong) yuzhi shiwen quanji</i> 清高宗(乾隆)御製詩文全集
ZCL	<i>Qinding shengchao xunjie zhuchen lu</i> 欽定勝朝殉節諸臣錄

⁷⁵ Wang Shoukuan 汪受寬, *Shifa yanjiu* 證法研究 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1995), pp. 20-23, 263-66.